Θεωρητική αντίληψη της γεωπολιτικής στο έργο Νταβούτογλου: Μια κριτική παρουσίαση

Section A

Theoretical Perception Of Geopolitics In Davutoğlu's Work: A Critical Presentation

Ioannis Th. Mazis National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Abstract. This text is a brief presentation of the course, in theory and in practice, of Ahmet Davutoğlu's views, as presented in his work Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001/2004 (18th edition) and in the corresponding partial translations of these texts by my colleague, K. Gogos (PhD in Geopolitics), as well as in the Greek published translation (Athens, Piotita editions, 2010). We shall present the ideological, Islamic and neo–Ottoman, background of this work, together with its main political proponents, on the level of Turkey's political power. Moreover, we shall present the main points of the scholar's geopolitical approach, that lie in the sphere of the classic geostrategists and geopoliticians of the German and the Anglo–Saxon school. Davutoğlu is a typical example of a researcher of international affairs, characterised by significant epistemological and methodological deficits.

He, too, fails to distinguish between Geopolitical Analysis, on the one hand, and Geostrategic Synthesis and suggestions, on the other. It is a fact, evident in the scholar's reference to ethical and scientific dilemmas of social scientists. His stance is a serious blow to his overall geopolitical analysis and integrates prima facie his methodology, together with the particular work of the Turk scholar, into the geostrategic epistemological sphere of political propositions (which are undoubtedly systematic and thorough). This paper concludes with a presentation of the points, on the Subsystem level, of Davutoğlu's geopolitical and geostrategic approach. In the light of the systemic geopolitical analysis, these points are considered geostrategically dangerous for Greece's national interests. This text aims to trigger a deeper and fuller study and understanding of Davutoğlu's work in the near future.

Ι. Analysis of the Ideological and Political Background of Davutoğlu's Theoretical Premises

Until the emergence of Özal at the core of Turkey's political sphere, the country's strategic visions have evolved through a series of three short–lived historical and ideological periods:

(1)     During the pre–WWI era, the stages in question were that of pan–Turkism and pan–Turanism. Quoting Murinson, “Pan–Turkism was a movement to unify the eastern (Central Asia and Caucasus) and the western (Anatolian) Turks. Following Russian expansionism in the Balkans under the banner of pan–Slavism in the later half of the nineteenth century, pan–Turanism arose as a romantic idea to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finnish–Ugorian peoples. It later served for a short time as a basis for the Turkish–Hungarian collaboration during the first two decades of the twentieth century to stem the Russian threat. These movements gained some influence among the Young Turks in the years preceding the First World War” [[1]].

(2)     During the Cold War era, the strategy of a Kemalist and post–Kemalist Turkey fully assumed the role of the ring levee, of a Rimland, in Spykman's terms, aimed to intercept the power projection tendencies of the USSR, both actual and possible, towards the Mediterranean basin, i.e. a centre of international trade axes of strategic importance between the East and the West, and the North and the South. In the context of this role, the country functioned as one of NATO's most important pillars in SE Mediterranean, and enjoyed significant tolerance towards its behaviour as a central actor in the post–Cold War Anglo–Saxon System of international hegemonic competition between the East and the West. Admittedly, during this stage, Turkey did not breach the so–called “Sèvres Syndrome [Treaty of Sèvres, 28 July/10 August 1920]” and oriented its policy to its interior, based on the fundamental regulatory power of this phobic syndrome. Besides, Özal supported and encouraged systematically the neo–Ottomanist movement (Yeni Osmanlicaler), which was known also as İkinci Cumhuriyetciler (the Second Republicans) [[2]]. The term neo–Ottomanism was introduced by a leading Turkish columnist and academic, Cengiz Çandar, to describe this tendency in Turkey's modern ideological and political reality. It was an intellectual movement, supporting the Turkish pursuit of an active and diversified foreign policy in the region, on the basis of the Ottoman historical heritage. The neo–Ottomans envisioned Turkey as the leader of the Muslim and Turkish–speaking worlds, and as a central power in Eurasia[3]. Since that period, the Turkish state has increasingly embraced the philosophy of neo–Ottomanism.

However, for the “Heart of the Enlightened” (Aydınlar Ocağı), the Turkish regime that prevailed after the coup of 1960, was a “pseudo–republic”, in which the religious authorities that were controlled by the state had oppressed the rights of the Muslims. This was intolerable, since there was not even a need to reassure the presence of Islam in the context of this Turkish “pseudo–republic”, given the fact that the majority of Turkey's populations was Islamic.

On the basis of this ideology, the “Heart” formulated an important ideological tendency, the so–called “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis”, which, according to İ. Kafesoğlu, its ideological leader, ought to “rewrite Turkey's political history, in the light of the cultural elements that were specifically related to the Turkic tribes, as they emerged in Central Asia, founded several states, were proselytised to Islam and successfully merged the Turkish cultural tradition with that of Islam. This complex cultural heritage created”, according to Kafesoğlu, “two great empires: of the Seljuks Turks and of the Ottoman Turks, but collapsed because of its Western aspiration that insulted the Turkish intellectuals. Its self–destructive result was the dismantling of the Family, Temple and Barracks Triptych, a centuries–aged source of inspiration for the Turkish collective consciousness, for the respect for the elderly, for discipline and for the sanctity of the duty”.

Therefore, Özal's policy, first as Prime Minister and leader of ANAP from 1983 until 1989 and then as President of Turkey from 1989 until his death in 1993, has set the foundation of the neo–Ottoman strategic vision. Özal and his brother, Korkut, were both members of the “Heart of the Enlightened [Aydınlar Ocağı]”, an elite organisation fostering the Muslim–Turkish ideology. It is characteristic that in 1993, Cengiz Çandar had said to Washington Post “I believe Kemalism makes Turkey introvert. It is time to revise this policy”. A decade later, Ali Bayramoğlu, wrote in Yeni Şafak, an Islamist daily newspaper, that the partisans of “neo–Ottomanism... are increasing every day” [[4]].

However Erbakan did not support the “Heart”, after taking over power and during the two years, approximately, of his premiership (1996–1997) until the “velvet coup d'etat” of the military that removed him from power. He considered the organisation to be an instrument of Turkish nationalism promoted by Türkeş and Demirel, rather than a true body of Islamic truth, which is “the only proper and comprehensive world view”. Erbakan was Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister who, in 1969, inspired by the premises of the Islamic–Turkish doctrine, had authored a pertinent book entitled Millî Görüş, which soon became the bible of Islamists of Turkish origin in Europe, under the aegis of an identically named organisation numbering about 26,500 ordinary and normally enlisted members in Germany [[5]]. It was first led by Erbakan's nephew, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan. In 2000, the organisation controlled approximately 50 large corporations in Germany and played a decisive role in the funding of the later established AKP, Erdoğan's party. Many members of Millî Görüş participated also in IHH, the organisation known for having organised the activist operation of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” on 31 May 2010. The German government banned IHH's branch in Germany in July 2010, accusing it of being directly linked to Hamas, an organisation ranked among terrorist organisations by the EU and the German government, and placing the entire network of Millî Görüş in Germany under observation by the German authorities.

(3)     In this context, during the post–Cold War era, when the “communist threat” had ceased to exist, Turkey's interior policy developed the features of a political Islam with a neo–Ottoman ideological and cultural formation, based also on Özal's ideological background and Erbakan's institutional political and ideological mechanisms, in collaboration with the phenomenon of Islamic and the Islamogenic orders, which had never been eliminated from the Kemalist and post–Kemalist oppression mechanisms.

This was something natural, particularly in the light of the syndrome of the peace treaty of Sèvres, more specifically in the light of the fear of Kurdish tendencies of secession and the preceding Islamist ideological basis, which had developed already. This tendency was amplified further by the US intervention in Iraq, which ended up in creating the semi–official state of Iraqi Kurdistan. This was a major incentive for the revitalisation of Turkey's existentialist fear, which was further materialised into interior Turkish policy, and, in particular, national security policy. Consequently, as M. Ataman [[6]] rightly suggests, neo–Ottomanism, after having initially been used as a response to the internal challenge of the nationalist and ethnic conflict with the Kurd separatists that were directed by PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, i.e. the Kurdish Labour Party), later infiltrated the foreign policy mentality of the modern institutions that formulate Turkey's policy. This fact has contributed to the surfacing of Davutoğlu's views on the neo–Ottoman Turkish strategy, given that Turkey's neighbours (Iran, Syria and Iraq) accumulated on their respective territories, populations of ca. 12 million Kurds. These, added to the 20 million Kurds of Turkey, make up an explosive population of an ethnically and nationally conscious group, a critical mass that is particularly threatening for the very existence of the modern Turkish state, according to Davutoğlu's views. Obviously, therefore, Islam has been considered the only probable strong cohesive material, which could reverse this (dangerous for Turkey) course of events. On the other hand, the creation of a big Kurdistan, extending from Baghdad to the Black Sea, and from Alexandretta (İskenderun) to Tauris (Crimea), which would create a projector of American power in the Middle East and would obviously serve the security of the state of Israel, would certainly downgrade Turkey's “strategic role as an embankment” for Anglo–Saxon aspirations. It would control 80 percent of the waters of the Middle East (Tiger and Euphrates) and the best oil reserves of the region (in Mosul and Kirkuk). Such a situation would serve neither the interests of Russia, nor of Iran and Syria.

In other words, the way had been prepared for the realistic geopolitical basis of Davutoğlu's approach. All that was needed, was someone to realise this fact and to be bold enough to take the risks of future unrest, as well as of unpredictable changes on the international scene. Davutoğlu, together with Gül and Erdoğan risk such changes. Their risks might, however, be too big to cope with.

ΙΙ. Davutoğlu's geopolitical aspirations

The entities of the historical, geographical and cultural depth are fundamental in Davutoğlu's approach, which is apparently, albeit not truly, geopolitical. In the perception of the Turk scholar, these are the fundamental components of strategic depth. Moreover, Davutoğlu defines historical depth as the feature of a country being “in the epicentre of [historical] facts” [[7]]. He acknowledges eight preceding empires, i.e. Great Britain, Russia, Austria–Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey, as being countries with a “historical depth”. In his comparative analysis, he concludes that these countries face similar problems of nationalism, of separatist tensions and of a general anti–imperialistic divide in their corresponding regions. As a result of this, Turkey is characterised by a significant “geographical depth”, owing to its “historical heritage” since the Ottoman era. In relation to Turkey, he posits:

Geographical depth is a measure of historical depth. For example, Turkey is not simply an ancient Mediterranean country. A significant feature distinguishing Turkey from Romania or Greece, is that the former is simultaneously a Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Contrary to Germany, Turkey is both European and Asian. Indeed, Turkey is a country of both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This geographical depth places Turkey exactly in the centre of many geopolitical influences [[8]].

Surprisingly, however, and surpassing the extensions of his methodology proper, he totally ignores the Roman Empire, as well as the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, and the naval empires of Spain and Portugal. The scholar's historical lapsus is inconceivable and pays no tribute to his title as scholar in Geopolitics, but rather only on that of Mr. Erdoğan's “political advisor”, indeed of an advisor who ignores historical facts and, plainly, directs his leader onto erroneous paths, putting the security of the entire region in danger. It should also be noted, on the one hand, that Mr. Davutoğlu is forced, even with malaise, to acknowledge Russia's supremacy in the region of Caucasus and Central Asia, and, on the other, he is henceforth obliged to take into consideration the specific sensitivities of all the countries in the region, by trying to consolidate Turkey's geopolitical position in Central Asia (and Caucasus) [[9]].

This planning, as (now) [[10]] suggested by the Turk “geo–strategist” is based mainly on two axes of exercising of geopolitical influence:

(a)    the economy/energy axis (i.e. private investments in Central Asia, infrastructure development, reinforcement of the transit energy role of Turkey and development of a nuclear component in the country's energy industry); and

(b)    the cultural axis, i.e. the enhancement and projection of linguistic and cultural affinity, reinforcement of ties by means of the Islamic cultural tool.

Therefore, from a methodological as well from a theoretical point of view, it is observed that the Turk scholar makes obvious use of two of the three power distribution pillars of the Systemic Geopolitical Analysis: of the pillars of Economy and Culture. On the subsurface, of course, he also promotes the political pillar as part of the cultural one, and, in addition, also the pillar of defence with his Mahanian strategic reference of the choke points, as will be shown below.

II.1. On methodology: the geopolitical factor and the neo–Ottoman complex in Davutoğlu's geopolitical approach

Davutoğlu is a typical example of yet another scholar on the international scene, of one who, beforehand, subjects his work to epistemologically dilemmatic arguments: he fails to distinguish between geopolitical analysis, on the one hand, and geo–strategic synthesis and recommendation, on the other [[11]]. This is apparent in the scholar's reference to the “ethical and scientific dilemmas” of social scientists – i.e. to an issue that has already been resolved theoretically by the modern neo–positivist research in social sciences, at least on a tentative methodological basis. The Lacatosian epistemological approach proves quite useful in the cases of these dilemmas. This methodological dilemma appears in the Author's Preface and is presented in the social sciences as the [capability or non–capability] “of the researcher to survive within his experimentation test–bench [[12]]. In other words, by proposing, as well as by promoting the “researcher's sense of belonging”, the scholar's approach is reminiscent of the successful, as well as rightful and caustic remarks of Panayiotis Ifestos in relation to the stance of the publicist scholar, which ultimately bends towards the nation–inspired end of the scale. This nation–inspired tendency, however, would never be typical of a geopolitical analyst. The latter has the option to assume a nation–inspired stance during the compulsory stage of Geostrategy, during which he must come up with recommendations and proposals, by considering the raison d'état of his country. Certainly, Davutoğlu's stance in this respect is not without a serious epistemological impact for his methodology in general and, certainly, makes the scholar's work part of the geostrategic epistemological nexus of systematic and detailed recommendations, which are always “nation–inclined and nation–centric recommendations”. In short, this is the level of geostrategic recommendations, since they incorporate the national perception, during the stage of their formation. We should also bear in mind that geopolitical analysis comes without “recommendations”, and does not end up in recommendations, but in models. Recommendations are the object of Geostrategy, i.e. of the approach subsuming a nation's perspective.

This deficit is critical for the author's international readers, considering his effort to persuade “scientifically” about the inescapable determinism of his arguments. It is unfortunate that I have to remark that there is no such method, nor is it documented in Davutoğlu's work. Unconsciously therefore, by failing to formulate a specific methodological proposal, the author adopts an unspecified, albeit typically causal, primal and unsophisticated “systemism”, as is apparent in his Introduction [[13]]: a “systemism” not succeeding in being identified in the context of Morton Kaplan's approach, or even in its periphery, but attempting however to simulate K. Waltz's theoretical reasoning and by using elements from Marxism alongside it, as has been interpreted by scholars within the “Centre–Periphery” circle, of the type of Rudolph Hilferding (Finance Capital, 1909), of Rosa Luxemburg (The Accumulation of Capital, 1912), of Nikolai Bukcharin (Imperialism and World Economy, 1915), Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin (Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916), of Samir Amin, etc. Consequently, by trying to approach Davutoğlu's geopolitical/geostrategic perspective, our effort will be inevitably directed towards locating ontologically and instrumentally common focal points, by targeting their fundamental structural formation and by stressing where necessary the theoretical deviations from the purely scientific systemic geopolitical analysis or its derivative, the geostrategic approach.

By focusing on the examination of the geopolitical approach of Davutoğlu's vision from the viewpoint of the systemic geopolitical methodology, we should first and foremost identify the “systemic geopolitical factor”, on which the analysis of the Turk scholar is generally based, despite the fact that this factor is nowhere declared as such. This factor is found in the variable designated as “Islamic world” or “Islamic civilisation”. The ambiguity observed in defining this concept is a natural outcome of his methodological ambivalence.

Subsequently, one has to observe that the activity of this geopolitical factor is identified by Davutoğlu in the context of a Complete Composite Geographical Space, extending over the entire planet and perceived as a Geographical Super–complex. This super–complex subsumes, in the mathematical construct of the Subsystem, Turkey's neo–Ottoman world, as a fundamental System. Davutoğlu is explicit in arguing that “the Islamic world, which has become the cross–sectional arena of these two phenomena, i.e. the cultural revival and the strategic antagonism, is [now] being transformed into the epicentre of International Relations” [[14]].

This remark, too, leads us to an instinctive, perhaps instrumental, assimilation of the concepts. This is attributable to the theoretical deficit of the author per se, as regards the eclectic and nation–centred methodological and theoretical formation of an apparently geopolitical, yet not truly geopolitical, process of analysis. This contradicts the very essence of the de–ideologicalised and de–nationalised systemic geopolitical analysis. For example, while he uses instinctively the basic structural features of a Complete Composite Space [[15]], he makes no effort to specify clearly, or to present their methodological position and place in his “analytical” process, which is allegedly geopolitical but in the final analysis falls within the scope of geostrategy.

III. Critique of Davutoğlu's effort towards a mathematical formula of power

Davutoğlu tries to define the systemic balances of power, in order to subsequently integrate Turkey into them and study the country's geostrategic present and future. To this end, he posits a pseudo–mathematical “formula of national power”, making use of overtly generic and exclusively qualitative coefficients, without proposing a process for their quantification for the needs of his future model, not even a general one. Moreover, in terms of purely mathematical formalism, this allegedly mathematical formula has been proposed to accommodate an “optical–aesthetic” result, considering for example that it is not necessary to put in parenthesis the product of any real numbers (assuming that SM [Strategic Mentality], SP [Strategic Planning] and PW [Political Will] can be expressed as real numbers, i.e. as subsets of R₀⁺) when multiplied by a sum within a parenthesis! On the other hand, it is necessary to propose a method for the quantification of terms, such as: Strategic Mentality, Strategic Planning and Political Will. Such an attempt is not impossible. Besides, in our view of systemic analysis, such figures are quantified, of course with certain reservations. Simply put, we consider that it was necessary to propose quantitative methods for converting the above–mentioned coefficients. On the other hand, there is no theoretical speculation with regard to the size of the “balance of power” underlying Davutoğlu's work as a whole. Considering the author's intention to relate theoretically to the parameters of power and to strategic planning, one would expect him to present an analysis of the epistemological problem inherent in the term “balance of power”, as well as of the definition of the “balance of power” in the context of the traditional “comprehension–centred” approach, i.e. an issue that is fundamental for Davutoğlu himself. This holds particularly true, considering that, to this date, this view [[16]] characterises the views of almost every politician, scholar and thinking citizen.

IV. On the clear... ambiguity of the definition of power and Davutoğlu's theoretical perspective

For the sake of theoretical foundation of our arguments, as well as in order to clarify things for the non–specialised reader, it should be stressed that the international community of publicists takes for granted the fact that no real scientific processing has ever been achieved with regard to the terminology used and the conceptualisation of the so–called “balance of power”, while the term itself has been strongly criticised on the grounds that it creates a serious confusion of causality [[17]]. In this context, E. Haas suggests in agony that there would be no difficulty in pursuing such an effort, had the term “balance of power” been placed above philological, semantic and theoretical ambiguities. Unfortunately, this is not the case [[18]]. Different authors define the term differently. In the final analysis, there is no precise scholarly definition, even though the term is the central concept in many, and obviously distinct, theories of international relations [[19]]. Haas reminds us also that Morgenthau, who had first suggested, used and supported the term “balance of power”, and who has become Davutoğlu's “theoretical ideal” had established at least the following concepts in relation to this term [[20]]:

(a)     a policy aimed at bringing about a certain power distribution;

(b)     a description of any actual state of affairs in international politics;

(c)      an approximately equal distribution of power internationally; and

(d)     a description of any distribution of power in international relations.

Haas, in turn, distinguishes at least... eight distinct perceptions in the use of the term, of which Davutoğlu seems to adopt a synthesis of three, as follows:

(a)     Balance meaning “Hegemony” or quest for hegemony, as in the case of Nicholas Spykman [[21]], who also regarded the balance of power as suggesting the quest for hegemony.

Spykman's view that states struggle for a hegemonial superiority and therefore are in more or less continual conflict with each other “has for its natural corollary that this conflict, if it stops short of total war, has to result in some sort of equilibrium” [[22]]. However, as Haas concludes, citing Spykman [[23]]:

The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. Whatever the theory and the rationalization, the practical objective is the constant improvement of the state's own relative power position. The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice.

such an equilibrium can never be stable, because the objective of politicians is not “balance” but hegemony.

(b)     Balance meaning “power politics” in general [[24]]. Haas holds in this respect, by referring to L. Bücher, that on many occasions the texts show that “the struggle for the balance of power, in effect, is the struggle for power” [[25]]. He concludes that in these cases,

power, politics of pure power, Realpolitik, and the balance of power are here merged into one concept, the concept that state survival in a competitive international world demands the use of power uninhibited by moral considerations. Lord Bolingbroke, in his fascinating Letters on the Study and Use of History, expressed similar ideas. He argued, in effect, that the concept of the balance of power was simply an eminently practical contrivance by which the states of Europe could determine when to combine in defensive allegiances against whichever state seemed to be working for hegemony, to “endanger their liberties”, i.e. to absorb them. Since this desire was thought to be inherent in either France or Austria at all times, the balance of power comes to mean any power combination to stop “aggression” [[26]].

This formulation of the term is often extended to include all the factors that contribute to a state's power and precisely, military installations, military facilities and strategic positions.

(c)      Balance meaning a “Universal law of history” [[27]]. Haas delineates this semantic group using examples from thw work of John Basset Moore, Frederick L. Schuman, Η. Morgenthau, J. – J. Rousseau, Friedrich Ratzel, l. Donnadieu και A. Sorel [[28]]. He posits:

John Basset Moore once wrote that “What is called the balance of power is merely a manifestation of the primitive instinct of 'self–defense', which tends to produce combinations in all human affairs, national as well as international, and which so often manifests itself in aggression. Not only was the Civil War in the United States the result of a contest over the balance of power but the fact is notorious that certain sections of the country have, during past generations, constantly found themselves in general relations of mutual support because of a continuing common interest in a single question” [[29]].

He therefore concludes [[30]] that

the point of departure of these usages is again the assumed inevitable and natural struggle among states for preponderance, and the equally natural resistance to such attempts. Given these two considerations, it follows that as long as they continue in force, there is bound to be a “balance” of states seeking aggrandizement and states opposing that search. In Frederik L. Schuman's version of balance, there is a tendency for all revisionist states to line up against the ones anxious to conserve given treaties.

With regard to Professor Morgenthau, he notes that in the American realist's view, “the 'imperialistic' states tend to line up against those defending the status quo, producing a balance in the process” [[31]]. Consequently, “it is often inherent in this formulation to consider Europe as a great 'confederation' unified by homogeneous morals and religion and tied together by international law” [[32]]. Moreover, the struggle of the balance of power “is part of that system and tends toward its preservation by avoiding the hegemony of a single member. And of course, it is in this formulation that the analogy to the mechanical balance is most frequently found” [[33]]. He then cites Rousseau's view [[34]] that the nations of Europe form among themselves a tacit nation... The actual system of Europe has precisely the degree of solidity which maintains it in a constant state of motion without upsetting it. The balance existing between the power of these diverse members of the European society is more the work of nature than of art. It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it re–establishes itself very soon on the other... This system of Europe is maintained by the constant vigilance which observes every disturbance of the balance of power.

As pertains to F. Ratzel, Haas suggests [[35]] that the German geographer and geopolitician

gave this outlook a geographical orientation by arguing that during the 'youth period' of states, a continuous process of expansion and contraction in a given Raum takes place, ending in a natural balance between the youthful contenders” [[36]]. Whether in this version or without the benefit of geopolitical notions, the theory is a widely held one, corresponding roughly to what Professor Wight calls the “static balance of power”. It was stated in detail by Donnadieu, who claimed that “destiny takes along him who consents and draws along him who refuses” said Rabelais. The balance of power is one of these necessary forces; in other words it is the expression of a law in the life of nations [[37]].

Moreover, with regard to Albert Sorel, Haas argues that the version of a universal law has been processed further.

In the first place, Sorel made no claim for the 'universality' of the principle, but confined its application to the ancien régime Europe, a time when politics among sovereign rulers was held to be entirely free from ideological determinations” [[38]]. Moreover, in spite of having regarded the policies of the balance of power as being “natural”, and to a large extent as being instinctive, he acknowledged that “the practice of balancing was the result of reasoned decisions based on the principle of raison d'état. For Sorel, political action is the result of the desire to accede to power (“power after power”), of greed and covetousness. “Aggrandizement is the policy motive which holds the key to the understanding of international relations” [[39]]. Also, the raison d'–état rules in all situations in which one feels oneself strong enough to follow with impunity the policies suggested by it. It inspires the same thoughts in Vienna and in Berlin. Young rulers and future ministers are taught about it. I read in the Institutions politiques of Bielfield: “In whatever situation a state may find itself, the fundamental principle of raison d'état remains unchanged. This principle, accepted by all ancient and modern nations, is that the welfare of the people should always be the supreme law.” “The great powers”, wrote an Austrian diplomat in 1791, “must only conduct themselves in accordance with raison d'état [...] Interest must win in all varieties of resentment, however just they may be”.

Sorel, according to Haas [[40]], holds that

the excesses of unrestrained and aggressive raison d'état doctrines result in their antithesis: moderation, willingness to forego expansion when the prize is small, and a willingness to abide by treaties if no undue sacrifice seems implied. Sorel sums up these restraints in the term “understood interest” (intérêt bien entendu), and maintains that if practised they result in a balance of power: “The convergence of ambitions is the limit to aggrandizement. Since there are no more unclaimed territories in Europe, one state can only enrich itself at the expense of its neighbours. But all the powers agreed in not permitting a single one among them to rise above the others. He who pretends to the role of the lion must see his rivals ally themselves against him. Thus there arises among the great states a sort of society, through common concern: they want to preserve what they possess, gain in proportion to their commitment and forbid each of the associated states to lay down the law to the others” [[41]].

In this sense, Haas concludes [[42]] that the balance of power thus comes to mean the instinctive antithesis to the reasoned thesis of raison d'état. Unconscious moderation, temporarily, restrains deliberate greed. A general dialectic of power relationships is thus created in which balances of power play a definite part. However, no balance is permanent and is subject to change at a moment's notice. It guarantees neither peace nor law; in fact, it implies war and its own destruction whenever a former counterweight state acquires sufficient power to challenge the very balance which it was called upon to maintain.

Davutoğlu's analysis, as presented in the Introduction of his book, as well as the terminology used for the concept of “natural” and “political” borders, for the concept of the “Mittelage / strategically central region / core areas)” and for the “struggle for space / Kampf um Raum” of the competing nation–state actors, lead us toward perceiving that the author's theoretical foundation is on Ratzel's theories of the Lebensraum [[43]]. His persistence on the notions of historical and geographical depth, in which he further subsumes the latter to the former, is the exact copy of Ratzel's “third principle on the nature of the state”, suggesting that the “geographical and historical context characterises the people who originate in a given state”. According to Ratzel, there is an unbreakable link between a state's history–civilisation, geographical physical space and people. In his Political Geography (Politische Geographie) Ratzel [[44]] posits that

when speaking of our country, we tend to add to its concept, on the one hand all that is the creation of man, and, on the other, the memories that are deeply rooted there. Thus, a substantially and initially geographical concept, in the strict sense of the term [natural–geographical] is transformed into a spiritual and sentimental tie between the residents of this locality and their History.

Also, in the same extract of his Introduction, Davutoğlu refers to a “vision of geopolitical frontiers” and for the “flexible/elastic borderline belt [[45]], depending to the changes of dominance”, clearly suggesting and re–coining his concept of Perception of space (Raumsinn), even though he uses the term in English and not in German, as one would expect. Had he used the German term Grenzen (limits), as adopted both by Ratzel and Haushofer, the content of his text would be much clearer [[46]]. Besides, Haushofer holds that borders are bio–geographical entities not subjected to legal limitations. Davutoğlu upholds this bio–geographical approach, starting from the initial text of his Introduction.

Haushofer considers that life can not be subjected to obsolete rules that inhibit its natural evolution and estimates that borders are sensible to the internal “pressure” of a nation (Volksdruck), particularly when the latter has developed on a pattern of squeezing tendencies, as is the case with Germany. The German geographer's theory of borders reflects their elasticity and flexibility. Borders are not simple lines delimiting a state's territory, but constitute “greater elastic/flexible belts” of vital interests and rights.

Davutoğlu upholds the same approach in the Introduction of his book, from a theoretical perspective. Throughout his work, also, he aims to implement these principles in the context of his neo–Ottoman model. Characteristic of his stance is the part of his introductory text [[47]], stating:

The powers that, in the context of such ventures, are not facing serious obstacles along the lines of their strategic expansion, are able to establish a unity between the central areas (N.B.: Mittellage) and the new belts. This unity is characterised by strategic consistency. There is a natural harmony between the central areas, the geopolitical/geo–cultural boundaries and the political borders of certain countries, as well as a natural dividing line (N.B.: natural border) with the outside world.

For insular countries, which he considers as having normal natural borders with the outside world and the neighbouring Continental Space, the Turk scholar posits [[48]]:

At times when a power of the Continental Space appears to surface, or when the insular country enters a period of strategic openings (N.B. Apparent here is Haushofer's concept of pressure/Volksdruck), there is an increase of interest and of interventions (N.B.: this relates to Haushofer's claim of vital interests and rights), by the central areas (N.B.: Mittellage) in the Continental Spaces.

It is obvious that Davutoğlu has been influenced extensively by Haushofer's principles, indeed in their worst and most aggressive form, in a form never really thought of by Haushofer himself.

There are also many other analogies to be found, precise, consistent and clear, with regard to the conception of borders, by comparing the Introduction (and even more) of Davutoğlu's book and the famous work of Karl Haushofer, Grenzen in ihrer Geographischen und Politischen Bedeutung (Borders in terms of their geographical and political importance), Berlin, 1927. Besides, the book of the Turk scholar brings to mind Hausshofer's anti–Slavic and anti–Anglo–Saxon geopolitical theory, as well as the concept of Pan–Asia and Pan–Europa proposed by Coudenhove–Kalergi. Haushofer, having been influenced deeply by the ideas of Kalergi, a scholar of Greek origin, proposed the “transcendence of nationalisms”, exactly as his Turk colleague proposed by utilising Islam, and wanted to contribute with his work to the “emergence of great continental countries, which would be formed by interlinked nations”. In turn, Davutoğlu, proposes his neo–Ottoman space and the theoretical tool of “zero frictions with neighbours”. Moreover, in a manner absolutely reversed, however in line with Davutoğlu with regard to targets, Haushofer aimed at the co–operation between Europeans, Russians and Japanese, in the context of a great alliance which would exclude the United Kingdom and the US.

Haushofer believed that it would not be possible for Germany to respect the borders imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, because it was obliged to be a big power and to unite all the Germans, by recovering its natural borders, i.e. the borders enabling the German people (Volk) to live and prosper. This is exactly what Davutoğlu posits, also: he does not acknowledge the premises of the Treaty of Lausanne, nor of any other international treaty, but considers that Turkey ought to become an hegemony in an imperial neo–Ottoman formation of the caliphate type, that would unite all the Muslims of the geographical complex, whether of Turkish origin or not, from the Danube, the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Greater Middle East, so that they can all live in line with their power and international role. All this will be analysed in the sections below.

Davutoğlu acknowledges the modernisation of the military character of the USA–Eurasia–Asia–Pacific axis, indeed in the sense “developed during World War II by the German geopolitical scientist K. Haushofer” and estimates that this axis is “emerging again in the form of the axes of international economic policy” [[49]].

Haushofer believed that the geostrategic control of the “buffer area” between Europe and Asia, i.e. the Aegean Sea and SE Mediterranean is the key to global prevalence. I think there should be no doubt by now, for the reader of Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth that the Turk scholar's views coincide fully with those of Hausshofer!

V. The Anglo–Saxon classical geopoliticians and their use in Davutoğlu's geographical and geopolitical approach

Davutoğlu estimates that Mahan's views and Spykman's geopolitical paradigm retain their importance, regardless of the fact that in the modern geopolitical and geostrategic conjuncture, whose characteristic is the rapid development of the weapon of air–force and the geostrategic exploitation of the airspace and outer space, and regardless of the geopolitical proposals of A.P. de Seversky relating to the geopolitical criticality of the North Polar “decision area”. Additionally, considering that by mixing the two paradigms (de Seversky and Spykman), Central Earth or the Zone of the Axis [[50]] approaches the “decision zone”, and, given that Turkey plays a crucial role in the Axis Zone, it will do the same also in the new context. He also considers crucial the Rimland [[51]] during the Cold War era and during the consistent rapid development of Nuclear Power, by focusing on the importance of low–intensity conflicts and by remarking that “during the period from World War II until the end of the Cold War, of the 50 in total low–intensity conflicts in which the US intervened directly or indirectly, 30 manifested in the Rimland” [[52]].

Davutoğlu remarks also the geopolitical restructuring and the dynamics this creates on the legal borders imposed by the Cold War following the geopolitical void created by its end with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and foresees in this stage the new role of neo–Ottoman Turkey. The new spaces related to the Turkish projection of power are those of Central Asia, of the Greater Middle East, of the Balkans, of Caucasus and of SE Mediterranean. In the methodological stage of the same effort, Davutoğlu focuses in particular on the geographical specification of the limits of critical sub–systemic geographical complexes comprised of nation–state actors sharing the above–mentioned “Islamic Civilisation”.

The author defines these complexes by describing them as “geopolitical axes” characterising the geostrategic perspective of neo–Ottoman Turkey:

The three geopolitical axes affecting the Close Terrestrial Basin of Turkey (N.B.: he means the Balkans, the Caucasian zone and the Middle East) are: (i) the Mesopotamia–Basra axis, affecting Caucasus and the Middle East; (ii) the Aegean Sea–Eastern Mediterranean [[53]] axis, affecting the Balkans and the Middle East [[54]]; and (iii) the Danube–Dardanelles–Black Sea axis, affecting the Balkans and Caucasus. Consequently, the space (N.B.: the Rim) defined by the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Basra and Mesopotamia is the one affecting all of the three sub–systems, i.e. the Middle East, the Balkan peninsula and Caucasus. For this reason, all our policies towards these zones should be evaluated [by Ankara] within the same general strategic context. These data, therefore, define the entirety of our bilateral relations, by exercising specific influences. Therefore, with regard to our cross–regional interactions, the relations between Turkey and Iraq, on the one hand, and Turkey and Syria [[55]], on the other, are defined dually within this strategic environment and are based correspondingly on two distinct foundations: the first corresponds to the Mesopotamia–Basra axis and the second to the axis of Eastern Mediterranean [[56]].

As pertains to Turkey's foreign policy in Central Asia, Davutoğlu posits that it should take into consideration the powers of the international system and their balances, on different levels: international, continental, i.e. European and Asian, and regional. It is in this context that he writes:

Turkey should, on a global level, push forward and project the utmost importance of its geopolitical and geo–economic role in the region, for NATO and the US, as well as its importance for the current and the future balance of the US–EU–Russia global axis. Similarly, it should also project its geopolitical and geo–economic importance for the EU and, simultaneously, enhance the balances in Asia, which depend to a great extent on Russia, China and Iran [[57]]. In the Asian continent, Turkey should develop bilateral relations and strategies on the East–West geographical axis, and primarily with Russia, China and Japan [[58]].

Davutoğlu's detailed geographical reference to sub–systems leaves no margin of doubt for the systemic character of his methodological approach. On the other hand, it also leaves no margin of misunderstanding about the prevalent role which the author wants his country to play in relation to the “geostrategic breakup of the Rimland”, so that Ankara be later in a position to negotiate, by itself, the security of the EU, of the US, of Eurasia, of Central Asia, of Eastern Asia, of the Middle East and of the Indian sub–continent. Of course, the use of NATO and the US in his argumentation leaves no room for misconceptions with regard to his aim in using the pillar of defence as a means of redistribution of power in the international geographical super–system/super–complex.

Moreover, having been influenced significantly by Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of the American geopolitical concept of “Naval Powers”, Davutoğlu places emphasis on the geographical and geopolitical importance of the so–called “choke points” [[59]]. He stresses that “the current geographical location functions as a significant advantage for the Islamic World [NB: the Umma [[60]]], making it capable of controlling the “choke points” delineating the warm seas of the planet, while also involving the intense risk of igniting an endo–systemic antagonism” [[61]].

He also stresses the fact that eight (8), of a total of sixteen (16), strategically more important “choke points”, i.e. the Suez Canal, Bab el–Mandeb (the exit from the Red Sea), the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait (between the islands of Sumatra and Java), the Lombok Strait (between Bali and Mataram) and Bosporus and the Dardanelles (exits from the Black Sea), are controlled fully by Islamic countries, while one of them (the Gibraltar Straits) separates an Islamic country (Morocco) from a European one (Spain).

However, after describing the said reality in a manner that might be considered threatening for any reader, and driven by the need to eliminate the stigma of threat from Islam (which the author himself describes with regard to the choke points)... he rejects Huntington's view that the Islamic World is a challenge for the core of Western Countries: “It is difficult to claim that the Islamic World can develop a global independent strategy as an anti–systemic power enjoying some kind of selective capacity in its involvement in the International System. The Islamic states, in general, are classified near the bottom of the social hierarchy of the International System” [[62]].

VI. Davutoğlu's view on “zero frictions with the neighbours” and the cases of Greece and Cyprus, in the context of his classical geopolitical views and their Hausshofer–inspired “re–orientation”

When it comes to Greece, Davutoğlu cynically defies his theory of “zero frictions with the neighbours”, referring to the “choke point” of the Dardanelles.

(a)     As regards the said geopolitical and geographical point of Turkey's geostrategic influence on the Balkan peninsula and on the Aegean Sea, the Turk scholar identifies two poles, antagonising Turkey on geostrategic terms: Greece and Russia. In relation to the geopolitical catalyst of Greece's geostrategic aims in this specific choke point, he is explicit in holding that “the Patriarchate of Phanar [sic] [[63]], with its small Greek community, aims to acquire an ecumenical character [sic]” [[64]]. In relation to Russia, he posits that, by raising claims on the Straits, it “tries to exercise influence on the Orthodox Slavs, in the area of the Balkans and of Caucasus” [[65]].

(b)     The paradigm to which the Turk academic and Foreign Minister resorts, is clear–cut in relation to Greece, and, more in particular, Thrace: for Davutoğlu, this region is the portal of expansion of the Turkish neo–Ottoman influence in the Balkans. He posits that it is part of the “Security Zone that was created in Eastern Thrace during the Cold War period”, which must be extended to the West, using multilateral and bilateral agreements that will be concluded in the Balkans” [[66]].  In addition, he sees this expansion as openly competing with Russia, in terms that are clearly Cold–War–inspired, and as a necessary element for creating “aegises of security in the periphery, or even outside the periphery, whose aim will be to balance the Russian factor in the region and, primarily, to prepare a master plan for safeguarding the internal security and the territorial integrity of Albania, of Bosnia and of Macedonia [sic]” [[67]].

(c)      In relation to Davutoğlu's plan for the Greek Dodecanese island complex, the Turk Foreign Minister is clear in positing that “At this point, the geopolitical and military reality must be harmonised with the economic and political reality. In the same way, the dependence of the Dodecanese on the continental plate of Asia Minor [i.e Turkey – he thus gives a geological aspect, which he plans to use in order to disallow Kastelorizo from claiming an EEZ or a continental shelf, even if the geological dimension is now absent from the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” [[68]].

Three fundamental questions arise out of this repugnance. First: which is the threat for internal security and integrity of these nation–state entities? Second, which is Turkey's influence on the non–completion of the Russia – Burgas (Bulgaria) – Alexandroupolis (Greece, Thrace) pipeline? Third, to what extent does Davutoğlu think that his use of the designation “Macedonia”, to describe FYROM, reduces tensions between his country and Greece?

It is obvious why, in the context of the above–mentioned geostrategic Turkish context, Ankara, invests in nautical bases in Albania, why it insists on being involved as a “protecting power” of Bosnia's interests, and why it has recognised FYROM as “Macedonia”.

The following citation from Davutoğlu's book is clear, as to his real intentions and meanings, and more in particular, as to his conceptualisation of the “zero frictions with Greece”: “Effort is being put so that Turkey becomes accustomed to experience, on a regular basis, tensions with Greece and Syria – this corresponds to a heavyweight wrestler's training, to confront medium–weight class wrestlers [sic] [[69]]. The consequence of this is that the country cannot fully exploit its potential. Turkey is now obliged to be upgraded so that, having attained a higher class, it may consider its relations with these countries as inferior elements and exercise only policies from above, vis–a–vis these countries” [[70]].

As pertains to Davutoğlu's strategic planning in relation to Cyprus, the cynicism of the toughest classical school of Geopolitics is explicit:

[1] [The latest developments have shown that] the US, by creating a dynamic link between their policies for Eastern Europe and the Middle East, aim to control Europe's Hinterland and fill the void of a geopolitical field that developed on the Balkan–Middle East axis, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Aegean Sea and Cyprus are two significant branches, both on the line of Eastern Europe and Middle East, in relation to land connection, and on the line of the Adriatic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Gulf, in relation to maritime connection [[71]].

[2] [...] In the context of this strategic planning, the Cyprus issue will come to the foreground more actively [...] Today, a field of a very dynamic interaction is formed between Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Adriatic Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf [...] On this line, uniting the Balkans and the Middle East, the development of new onsets will be inevitable [[72]].

[3] [Sub–chapter title] Turkey's strategic Gordian knot and Cyprus. Cyprus, located centrally in the world's continent, almost equidistantly from Europe, Asia and Africa, together with Crete, is found on a line intersecting the routes of maritime passage. Cyprus is located between the Straits that separate Europe and Asia and the Suez Canal that separates Asia and Africa. Moreover, it also has the location of a stable base and of an aircraft carrier that catches the pulse of the sea routes of Aden and Hormuz, together with the basins of the Gulf and the Caspian Sea, which are the most important routes linking the Eurasia and Africa [[73]].

[4] A country that ignores Cyprus cannot be active in the world and peripheral politics. In world politics, it cannot be active because this small island occupies a position that (may) influence directly the strategic linkages between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa, and Europe and Asia. In peripheral politics, it cannot be active, because Cyprus points with its eastern nose in an arrow–like manner to the Middle East, while its western ridge it is the cornerstone of strategic balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and Northern Africa [[74]].

[5] Turkey, affected because of its location by a multitude of balances, is obliged to assess its Cyprus policy, taking it out of the Turkish–Greek equation. Cyprus is increasingly becoming an issue of Eurasia and Middle East–Balkans (Western Asia–Eastern Europe). [Turkey's] Cyprus policy should be put in a new strategic framework, and in a manner appropriate for this new strategic framework. On the issue of Cyprus, from the side of Turkey, this importance can be found in two main axes. The first axis is that of human value, oriented towards safeguarding the security of the Muslim Turkish community, as a result of Turkey's historic responsibility [[75]].

[6] Any incompetence [of Turkey] that [may eventually] obtain in the issue of securing and protecting the Turkish community in Cyprus could spread as a wave into Western Thrace and Bulgaria, even into Azerbaijan and Bosnia. The second important axis of the Cyprus issue is the importance of this island in geostrategic terms [...] Even if there were no Muslim Turks in Cyprus, Turkey would be obliged to preserve a Cyprus issue. No country can remain indifferent vis–a–vis such an island, which is located in the heart of its very vital space [...] [[76]].

[7] This geostrategic importance is two–dimensional: One dimension has a narrow strategic importance, and is related to the balances between Turkey and Greece, on the one hand, and between the TRNC and the Greek part [sic], on the other, in the Eastern Mediterranean. The importance of the second geostrategic dimension is great, and is related to the place of the island in the context of international and regional strategies [[77]].

[8] No regional or world power can ignore Cyprus when making strategic calculations in the Middle East, in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Aegean Sea, in Suez, in the Red Sea and in the Gulf. Cyprus is placed such an ideal distance from all these areas, that has the capacity of a parameter capable of directly influencing each one of them. The strategic advantage which Turkey gained in the 1970s, on this very parameter, must be used not as the element of a defensive Cyprus policy aimed to safeguard the status quo, but as a fundamental support of a maritime strategy with a diplomatic nature [[78]].

VII. Again... the German Geopolitik and F. Ratzel and K. Haushofer

The scholar's persistence on Ratzel–inspired theoretical approaches (which are totally realistic, from a geostrategic point of view) becomes clear also at this point of his geostrategic planning. His preference is absolutely logical, given that he places Turkey at the centre of the Arab–Muslim and Balkan–Muslim world. Geographically speaking, the said placement in the specific subsystems (the Balkans and the Greater Middle East) necessitates perceiving the neo–Ottoman Turkey as located in the centre of Haushofer's Euro–African N–S zone, so that Ankara can exercise the influence potentially offered to it by the Islamic geopolitical factor, to the North and to the South alike. The Ratzelian entity that dominates the scholar's thought, in addition to the concept of Lebensraum, is that of Verkehr (circulation), indeed in its Haushoferian extensions. He considers merchandise transports as a means to exercise control over the actual trade flows and, consequently, over their respective money flows. He proceeds by extending this control as a tool of dominance, from the part of the controlling ethnic state actor, on the remaining actors of each geographical complex. Let us examine some examples.

(1)     The transport and road axes of all kinds, which the scholar proposes and analyses, extending from Istanbul to the Adriatic Sea and the Danube, as well as from the Balkan peninsula to the Middle East, which must, furthermore “function as a foreign policy element” of Ankara, and as a support framework for the “formations of an economic and political character that will be created in the region” [[79]].

This geostrategic approach by Davutoğlu, in relation to the Greek geostrategic provisions, adopts once again processes of expansionism and conflict, by utilising the geopolitical cultural pillar. From a methodological perspective, the author, always within the classical Ratzelian and Haushoferian frame of thought, proposes the geostrategic tool of transport axes as a means to project the neo–Ottoman power in the Balkans and, of course, towards Greece. He posits: “The Turkish and Muslim minorities living in Bulgaria, in Greece, in Macedonia [sic], in the Sanjak, in Kosovo and in Romania are important elements of Turkey's Balkan policy”. It is clear that the Turk Foreign Minister refers to the instrumental use of the said minorities, existent or non–existent, for Turkey's power projection in the Balkans, through destabilisations in the interior of the Balkan (and not only Balkan) countries. In this geostrategic context, the Turk Foreign Minister defines two long– and short–term targets for Turkey's foreign policy in the Balkans, as follows: (i) the strengthening of Bosnia and Albania; and (ii) the creation of an international legal framework that will place under its protection the ethnic minorities of the region. Further, by placing Turkey's power projection mechanism in the said geostrategic construct, the scholar explains with a disarming clarity that “in this legal framework, Turkey must always opt for ensuring guarantees that will allow it to intervene in matters related to the Muslim minorities of the Balkans”. Leaving no doubt on how Mr. Davutoğlu and the neo–Ottoman Turkey perceive legality, he states in the very same clause that “the legality of the intervention in Cyprus, being an impressive example for the modern era [[80]], was made possible in such a legal framework.”. He therefore leaves absolutely no margin to any Kantian idealist or supporter of democratic ideals of the modern neo–Ottoman Turkey to assume or understand anything else, on the more peaceful end of the scale. However, he attributes relevant intentions of a geostrategic character also to Greece, suggesting that Athens purports to achieve such aims in the Balkans through the Ecumenical Patriarchate – an institution of which the ecumenical character he rejects! Similarly, he discovers Russian and Greek claims in the Straits, which he can only fend off with the above–mentioned Balkan policy of the Turkish–Muslim minorities [[81]]! His analysis is formulated by (rightly) stressing the consistency of the rise of colonialism for the geo–complex of the Middle East, which for Davutoğlu “held a very important position on the communication arteries between the colonial empires and their colonies” [[82]]. Also, he does not conceal Haushofer's approach, which he deems to be correct: “Haushofer, who showed the way to Hitler” [[83]]. It is an approach which, for Davutoğlu, had already been justified by Napoleon's attack on Egypt (Suez) when the French “leader who took action aiming at world dominance” was heading towards India...

There are numerous passages in the book, that consolidate the reader's belief in relation to the strong influence of the German classical school of Geopolitik on the Turk Foreign Minister.

His rationale is governed by the principles of antagonism among ethnic actors with a potential for International Power, in traditional geopolitical terms. Epistemologically speaking, however, we should stress that Davutoğlu defines the geopolitical axes of power –Culture, Economy and Politics– as geo–cultural, geo–economic and geopolitical, correspondingly. More specifically, however, the need to define the pillar of political power as “geopolitical” creates an ambiguity between Geopolitics, viz. a geographical analytical tool, and the corresponding pillar, proving that the said definition is unsuccessful. Consequently, we shall insist on our definition of “four pillars of geopolitical redistribution of power”: defence, economy, politics and culture/information.

VIII. The fundamental functions of Davutoğlu's geopolitical factor

(a) The conflict of Islam with the West

In his “apparently geopolitical”, but basically ethnocentric geostrategic vision, Davutoğlu combines two geographical areas: “From the North, the area of N. Caucasus, up to the South, in Kuwait” and “the southern side of Central Asia”. He stresses that their participation in the Islamic Civilisation “provides common elements to this imaginary community” [[84]], which is full of contradictions between the internationally recognised areas and the de facto reality [[85]]. He thus raises the status of the unity of the Islamic Umma to that of an “ideal geopolitical structure”, in other words of the System/Geographical Complex, in the context of which he observes the action of the fundamental geopolitical factor, disfavouring the concept of “Nation–State”. The only nation–state entity which Davutoğlu accepts –in political and in ethnic terms– is the neo–Ottoman Turkey. This is of course considered a major contribution to “world civilisation by modern Turkey” and is defined by Davutoğlu as a “cultural aperture” aiming to “annul the geo–cultural rejection of Turkey [in Huntington's and in Brezinski's terms]” [[86]]. Turkey, therefore, “owing to the experience it has gained from its own civilisation” will preserve the hegemony of the neo–Caliphate imperial formation, to which Davutoğlu aims and which he scrupulously plans and promotes. And it does so, without ever considering the objections of Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the true leading powers of the Shiite and the Arab–Muslim Sunnite world, respectively. Consequently, he does so without attempting a realistic analysis of undoubtedly existing elements competing his “geopolitical–like”, but not geopolitical, analyses.

Davutoğlu does not reject the notion of nation–state using as a tool the liberalist, post–ethnic and nation–eliminating polemic that is exercised extensively against the nation–state. He does not even resort to the advanced, as well as doubtful, interpretation of Negri & Hardt (Empire, 2000). As will be obvious to the researcher of political Islam, he rejects the notion with the tool of Islamic “legality” [[87]]. On the basis of legal rules, even on a political basis, political Islam, too, rejects the notion of nation–state, and of the Umma [[88]], the Community of the Faithful, in the context of which there is no place for nation–state formations: the latter are considered “states–fragments” of the Umma and “are the result of the betrayal of Islam by its profane Princes” [[89]].

Naturally, in his texts, Davutoğlu replaces the term “Umma”, a term with religious nuances, using the more neutral term “Islamic Civilisation”. He also maintains the emphasis on the religious aspect of cultural conflict. However, the notion of Umma differs from the notion of Islamic Civilisation, to such a degree as to not even constitute its product: civilisation was given once and for all through the Words of God. The means by which the Word of God becomes known constitute a collateral function of the Divine Message, within which and in “absolute orthodoxy”, all the needs of the people are obligatorily exhausted. The author, by using the term “Islamic Civilisation”, refers to specific material and spiritual activities of people, “in place and in time”. He would thus have to specify these activities, spatially and temporally, and avoid the elusiveness of the reference to an “incongruous and timeless civilisation”, to which the Umma must blindly submit. In the context of this effort for the ontological outside determination of his proper Islamic systemic geopolitical factors and Islamic subsystems, Davutoğlu exercises, already in 1992, a covert critique against the “Western–oriented” Kemalist regime, and of the Army in particular, as a self–appointed guardian of the secular Democratic Order and as a potent supporter of Turkey's candidacy in NATO and of the Alliance with the United States. He is thus led to the conclusion that “a democratic system in the Islamic World can create Islamic regimes with anti–Western sentiments” [[90]]. The corrupted military and political elite of certain Islamic countries has exploited this fear and collaborated with the international systemic powers of the democratic West, so as to destroy the democratic processes in the Islamic world” [[91]]. The conclusion drawn readily from the above remark of the Turk scholar is this: the democratic processes create “Islamic regimes with anti–Western sentiments” when applied to national social formations with an Islamic cultural background. The question raised, however, is: did Davutoğlu have to write this, for us to realise it? Or are we still failing to realise it? With respect to this point, the West should be really concerned as to what it has to do in similar situations of national social formations with an Islamic cultural background, which must shift smoothly to forms of governance that are beneficial for their peoples, with the aim to co–exist peacefully with the West. This is an issue of utmost importance, and unfolds in front of our eyes, in the context of social uprisings and of political and geopolitical rearrangements that will follow in the Arab–Muslim world (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, etc.).

Methodologically speaking, a simple neo–positivist analyst might accuse Davutoğlu of dangerous metaphysical digressions, of the type characterising in my opinion the modern meta–ethnic structuralism! However strange this may sound, in 2001, when these estimations were made, the structuralist and neo–structuralist tendencies had reached their peak! Besides, reading in the same 2001 text the description of the super–national character of Islamic Civilisation, which has produced a global system and surpassed the model of the nation–state, as being the “creature of Western imaginary”, one can only be surprised and think that Davutoğlu belongs to the highest ranks of the “critical neo–structuralist meta–ethnic school”. Yet, this is not true! This mistake would be made, of course, by a scholar ignorant of the Caliphate approach of Islam, and of the practical non–existence of the concept of nation–state in its context [[92]]. Consequently, this description by the Turk scholar is made on the pretence of being a “Muslim legal regulator”, not a cold–blooded geopolitical analyst. Besides, in his theory, he stressed the importance of the “universality of Islamic civilisation” as an “ontological consciousness that penetrates directly the mind of every person, irrespectively of his ethnic and local origin” [[1]]. In this sense, the Turk Foreign Minister has defined the Super–system of neo–Ottoman Turkey, also from an anthropological point of view. In short, he has defined the neo–Caliphate Complete Composite Space that will cede its hegemony to Ankara.

Therefore, a theoretical conclusion related to Davutoğlu's effort to specify his Geopolitical Factor and the subsequent Systems of his Paradigm, would be the fact that he uses the ideologicalisation of Islam that derives from his own culture, and within which lies the integral part of the Caliphate element, being connected with Islam [[93]]. He also surpasses the nationalisms that are annoying for a multi–ethnic pole of power, and suggests, as “soft power”, the Islamic cultural historical and social ontological scheme, as a tool of power projection and enforcement for the neo–Caliphate Turkey. Islam, with its above–mentioned features, allows the Turk scholar to utilise the analytic advantages of the Complete Composite Spaces, i.e. the qualitative and ultimately quantitative or percentage–based benchmarks of the four geopolitical pillars of power redistribution: defence, economy, politics and culture. He is, however, confronted with continuous discrepancies as to the “softness” of the paradigm he proposes, because he presents Islam, on the one hand, as being necessarily in conflict with the West and, on the other, as being a “soft power” that has no reasons to clash with the West!

A typical example of such a contradiction is presented in the scholar's theoretical presentation, in which he uses a Marxist–oriented semiotic to present his geopolitical factor, i.e. the “Islamic World” as an “international collective proletarian” [[94]] with ethnic–social and cultural traits. Now therefore, following Davutoğlu's reasoning, one finds the historically–given cultural, political and social explosion of the proletarised Islamic world, within the very dynamic nature of the (here) Marxist–oriented (and yet eclectic) semiotic. In short, one finds his revolt against the Western international hegemonic system, and, therefore, its revolutionary outside determination in relation to this point! The Turk scholar seems to have been influenced by Roger Garaudy in this respect: the French philosopher supported similar views in his first announcement in Cairo, invited by the Union of Arab Artists [[95]].

The controversy is clear: Davutoğlu suggests in the same text that the references to “Islamic threat” are merely American, and generally Western ideological constructs that were forged due to the new geopolitical and geostrategic realities or capabilities, so as to provide an ideological basis for “strategic and tactical operations, with the aim to acquire control of these capabilities” [[96]].

In other words, in Davutoğlu's methodological approach there is a clear effort to exonerate the “Islamic geopolitical factor”, so as to create the necessary premises of trust and to safeguard, in the Islamist Caliphate ontological scheme, the international geographical space, as the supersystemic space of its activities, even on the level of the four geopolitical pillars of power redistribution.

Simultaneously however, the scholar makes the general claim that “the process of secularisation can be considered to be a direct threat to the self–preservation of the non–Western societies” [[97]]. The conclusion drawn from this claim is that the national social formations with an Islamic cultural background are destroyed obligatorily through the processes of their modernisation, no matter how successful these may be. The morale of the story is therefore that these societies will avoid collapsing, only if they follow their Islamic cultural origins and its consequent commandments. However, these are the unified Islamic space, with its geographical and historical depth. It is consequently a Caliphate, even if on a first level its structures do not refer to Abdul Hamid II, who was the model of continuity of the real new Caliphate by the Muslim Brothers of Egypt [[98]]. Davutoğlu does not cease to criticise the nationalist model of “modernisation” and “secularisation” that was imposed by Kemal's elite on the Turkish society, and denounces the emergent social phenomenon of the “split personality” of the Turkish society. He proposes therefore the determination, anew, of the periods of historic development of the non–Western (i.e. also of the Islamic) societies in the 21st century.

It is therefore understood that this contradiction is necessary for the scholar, in his effort to cover the anti–systemicity of his “Islamic Factor”, particularly during the year 1988, when he first sustained these views, systematically and theoretically, i.e. during Özal's administration, a “suspect” period, in the eyes of the neo–Kemalists. Davutoğlu distinguishes between the period of “early modernisation”, during the first half of the 20th century, and the period of Cultural Revival, towards the end of the same century. The first period was characterised by the supremacy of the “early modernists”, who “tried to achieve a national or cultural self–preservation vis–a–vis the attacks of the colonial powers” [[99]]. The second period is characterised by the dominance of the “cultural revivals” who “try to achieve the revival of their authentic stature, so as to re–determine their position, ontologically and historically” [[100]]. Consequently, for Davutoğlu, it is the result of the crisis of the Western secularist ontology.

From the same, anti–Western perspective, Ahmet Davutoğlu strongly criticises the post–Cold War foreign policy of Turkey, and Turkey's geostrategic planning towards Central Asia, by underlining “Turkey's unreadiness to respond to the requirements of the post–Cold War era” [[101]].

He stresses in this sense, and in a new–realist Waltzian manner, that Turkey did not realize, in a timely manner, the end of the “static bipolar international system” and the creation of a “dynamic multi–faceted international system”, so as to appropriate its strategies and foreign policy for this scenery [[102]].

Back in 2005, in our analysis of Davutoğlu's assertions in the context of a research programme of the Laboratory of Geocultural Analyses, we had remarked [[103]] that “Davutoğlu identifies also the different forms of the 'Turkish unreadiness' for strategic analysis of the international system formed, as follows: (a) psychological; (b) theoretical; and (c) institutional unreadiness” [[104]].

(a)     Psychological unreadiness, because “Turkey faced the new international scenery in Central Asia, sentimentally and with nostalgic visions, without composure, without pragmatism”;

(b)     Theoretical unreadiness, because of the “lack of university and research centres capable of evaluating appropriately and scientifically the new post–Cold War data and of proceeding to healthy strategic analyses”. Referring to the causes of the “theoretical unreadiness”, Davutoğlu writes: “two are the main reasons of this unreadiness: the first is historical, and the second ideological [...] The history of Modern Turkish Diplomacy, starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz and extending through the Tanzimat period, has as background the European parameters and the lines of defence of the Middle East – Balkans axis. In this period, the strategic perception, the political and cultural factors, the institutional construct and foreign policy had as their centre the Diplomacy of the Great Powers and Europe” [[105]].

Consequently, the lack of an Ottoman/Turkish diplomatic tradition of an analogous size is obvious: it should be directed to Asia. Coming to the analysis of the second reason of “unreadiness”, Davutoğlu mentions that “the ideological reason is no other than the continuous effort for Westernisation, which was modelled on Europe”. It is therefore understood that the role of Central Asia, being a geostrategic target and a “vital space” [[106]] for Turkey, had been degraded during the 20th century. The importance of the “ideological reasoning” is supported, according to Davutoğlu, by a further parameter, which is related to the characteristics of the post–Cold War period: “The static perception of the bipolar world, the splints of ideology, as well as the supremacy of the two super–powers in strategic decision–making, did not leave margin for different ideological and strategic approaches” [[107]].

(c)      Institutional unreadiness. Davutoğlu criticises Turkey's foreign policy, also therefore of the military establishment that plans and implements this policy, stressing that “in designing and implementing its Central–Asian policy, [it] has failed to exploit its geographical location, and its demographic potential”, at least until the time his book was published, in 2001. His criticism is intense, particularly vis–a–vis the military, political and bureaucratic establishment, because “[it] has failed to co–ordinate, not only the specific policies of the country in Western and Central Asia, but also the centres implementing foreign policy as well, with the aim to maximise the profit and the influence of Ankara” [[108]]. In view of exercising a more effective foreign policy, the Turk scholar suggests “sacrificing micro–strategy in the altar of macro–strategy” [[109]].

There are important similarities, at this point, with Özal's geostrategic vision, as it was presented by the late T. Özal, as Dr. Ilias Iliopoulos points out [[110]]. Özal unreservedly “promoted the said geographical region [NB: of Central Asia] to a 'natural and historical area of Turkish influence'” and referred to “the historic opportunity of Universal Turkism” [[111]], in view of the detachment of Central Asia from Moscow.

Also, the late T. Özal, “turning the eye on the Balkan peninsula, spoke of 'opportunities presented once every three hundred years' [[112]] and explained that the 'present historical conjuncture is an opportunity for Turkey to reverse its course of shrinkage, which commenced in front of the walls of Vienna, by activating the Muslim minorities in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece'” [[113]]. Perhaps, we should take more often into consideration, in our “happy” country his argument on the “activation” of the Muslim minorities in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which constituted also the late Özal's geostrategic planning, particularly after their adequate “activation” in the case of Yugoslavia (!). This will hold particularly true, if it is proven that this planning continued to characterise also the later Turkish geostrategic thought, such as of Mr. Davutoğlu. This thought is similar on many significant respects with Özal's neo–Ottomanism. Moreover, in the modern neo–Ottoman strategic planning, Ankara's geostrategic aspirations are omnipresent in the zone delineated by Eastern Aegean and Cyprus, in a manner characterised by permanent properties of a geostrategic nature.

Adding to the above, the renowned Syrian Professor of International Relations at the University of Göttingen [[114]], Dr. Bassam Tibi, relates to the ideological and political clash in Turkey's political and cultural life: “In Turkish politics, a cruel struggle is taking place between the Islamic zealotism with a neo–Ottoman/pan–Turkic orientation [des neo–osmanisch–pantürkisch orientierten islamischen Fundamentalismus] and Kemalist secularism [[115]] [...] In our days [NB: in 1998, when the book was published] a re–evaluation of Ottomanism is taking place [in Turkey]. We are not dealing simply with an ideology, but with different geopolitical conditions” [[116]]. Relating further to Erbakan, Tibi writes: “In Erbakan's ideology and in the ideology of his three parties to date, there is an obvious particular mix of traditional Islam, of religious Zealotism –the so–called 'Islamism' in the world of Islam– and of Turkish Nationalism. The result is a pan–Turkic neo–Ottomanism [[117]]”. As pertains to Davutoğlu's view about a conflict directed by the American ideological constructs of Washington, and about the “indivisible and compact character of Umma and of the Islamic world”, Tibi mentions, indeed in a caustic manner, the issue of the endo–Turkish and endo–Islamic ideological and cultural war. He posits that: “The clash of civilisations is taking place primarily within the limits of Islamic Civilisation. As pertains to Turkey, our interest lies in the fact that the said conflict is not taking place between the 'West' and 'Islam', but within Turkey, and therefore within the Islamic Civilisation, since in this case the Turk Kemalists are combating with the –equally Turk– Islamists [[118]]”.

All this shows to a “happy” Greece that we should, first and foremost, realise the form of political and cultural thought that governs the international actor that is Turkey, and then decide about the “political taming”, a process that will supposedly allow us to hope that we can change the way our “ally, friend and neighbour Turkey” behaves in the bilateral relations of our two countries. It is not our belief, however, that this type of policy can ultimately influence the minds of the geostrategic planners of the vision of neo–Ottoman Turkey. This can only be achieved with decisive geostrategic changes, together with an attentive evaluation of the context of such changes by Greece. Moreover, such changes, if they are brought about, will be the outcome of the resolution of the Iraqi issue and the foreseen trisection of the Iraqi formation, in the form of a lax confederation of three state entities (the former Ottoman sanjaks of Mosul, of Baghdad and of Basra), of the creation of an independent Palestine State and of the security of the State of Israel, whose policy has clearly and conclusively diverted from that of Ankara.

Also, in the light of the political, statal and geostrategic rearrangements in the region of Maghreb and of the Greater Middle East, it is indispensable for Israel to co–operate with Greece, on all levels: defence, economy and politics. These are prospects, for which Athens must be fully prepared to proceed on all levels.

(b) The conflict of Islamic Eurasianism with the the Slavo–Russian cultural identity

Always within the same ideological framework, Davutoğlu does not hesitate to create an Islamic “Eurasian identity”, which he sees extending “from Albania to Kazan, from Bosnia to Chechnya, from Crimea to Tajikistan” [[119]]. Also, he does not hesitate to postulate a fundamental hostility between this “Islamic Eurasian identity” and the “Slavic and Russian influence”. He writes: “The most important element that can eliminate the Slavic and Russian influence in these areas is the opponent cultural [[120]] force of defence offered by the Islamic identity [[121]]. He continues his argument, once more by attributing “national minority characteristics” to the “Eurasian Islamic identity”. He writes: “Perceiving the common fate of these communities makes Islamic identity part of a common perception of minority”. It is therefore simple: On the one hand, he proposes the clash of the two identities, and, on the other, he organises the Islamic Eurasian communities into a common national minority entity. This is of course a gross oversimplification, which however leaves no doubt about Davutoğlu's intended aim, i.e. the projection of all sorts of Turkish power in Eurasia, through the invention of “Islamic Eurasianism” and of the Turkish neo–Ottoman vehicle. In other words, Davutoğlu proposes a geostrategic–like conflict between the Eastern–Orthodox dogma of the Slavo–Russian element and the Islamic–Eurasian element! Not quite what one might regard as “peaceful perception”, coming from a scholar advocating the theory of “zero frictions with the neighbours”!

IX. Geostrategic recommendations and prospects according to Davutoğlu's approach

Consequently, the reasonable question, how would these strategic aims of Turkey be achieved in Asia, is answered specifically, and in a somewhat complex manner, by Mr. Erdoğan's Advisor. According to Mr. Davutoğlu, Turkey needs:

(a)     to plan its individual strategies and policies;

(b)     to develop large–scale strategies;

(c)      to focus on the balances of power in Asia, and not only on the preservation of international balance;

(d)     to develop and foster the axes of co–operation (e.g. of Turkey–Iran, Turkey–Israel, etc.);

(e)     to be flexible in its foreign policy;

(f)      to exploit supra–national organisations (e.g. the Economic Co–operation of Bosporus), with the aim to increase its influence and to avoid tensions [[122]].

The requirement for Turkey is clear, according to Davutoğlu: “Turkey's geopolitical position necessitates the planning of dynamic policies with many orientations, that are capable of utilising all sorts of options, and not of static policies, depending on the strategic priorities of various other actors [[123]]. Turkey is entering into the present dynamic and translational period, holding a position that is by far advantageous in the New Order, as will be formed by the countries that are capable of utilising and proving strategic consistency and flexibility” [[124]].

In other words, Davutoğlu considers a “strategic renewal” to be necessary and imperative for Turkey, irrespectively of the “preferences of other actors”, referring clearly to the US! He writes: “This strategic renewal presupposes, in principle, a new context for planning strategic perceptions and a new stance towards this context” [[125]]. This new “stance” that is proposed by the Turk geostrategic analyst and Foreign Minister is that of the neo–Ottoman formation of the Middle Eastern, Balkan and Central Asian Composite Space, in which dominates Turkey's hegemonic role.

Further, he includes Middle East as a primary actor in the “New perception and stance”, on the part of Turkey, because he considers this region to be one of utmost geopolitical importance. He stresses that “Middle East is part of the Close Terrestrial Basin [that surrounds Turkey], with the Balkans and Caucasus. Consequently, Turkey should not distract its attention from this Basin [...] We should not forget that the political, economic and cultural significance of Turkey in international affairs will continue to be bound to the influence and the presence of Turkey in this Basin” [[126]].

The geostrategic importance and the new, now fluid, geopolitical characteristics of the Middle East are clear for Davutoğlu in his description: “Currently, the Middle East is not within a long–lasting bipolar scheme, under the influence of Cold War conditions” [[127]]. On the other hand, the delineation of borders in the Middle East –which has been the product of colonialist fragmentation– does not promise a stable future. This unbalanced and unstable structure of the Middle East now pushes towards the re–formation of the short–term policies on the part of each of the actors, with the aim to create long–term and permanent Spheres of Influence” [[128]].

The Turk scholar and Foreign Minister, acknowledging the unstable character of the state actors in the region, attributes the latter to their artificial nature. A nature obtaining because of the pre–existing European colonialism. His analysis is not far from the corresponding Marxist approach [[129]], neither from the known approach of Ralph Peters [[130]]. There are differences with Peters, of course, at least with regard to the hypothesis of the creation of a Kurdish state on the territories of Eastern and South–Eastern Anatolia. Yet, for Davutoğlu the problem is that “the Turkish policy in the Middle East must be seriously revised, in the context of the new facts. During the first quarter of the 20th century, Turkey was deprived of the zones of Middle East, the ones mostly important in strategic terms, while during the second and the third quarters, it experienced the alienation from the region. Moreover, during the last quarter of the 20th century, it turned its interest on the region and developed a chain of relations with regressions. Now it is obliged to re–evaluate its relations, in a new and radical manner” [[131]].

In short, the Middle East must become a field of first priority for the Turkish power projection strategy and the corresponding foreign policy. A consequence of this will be the setback of the rhythm of Turkey's accession to the EU. Davutoğlu holds in this respect: “The tension in the relations between Turkey and the European Union, all the more make inevitable for Turkey the development of a wide regional strategy for the Middle East. A Turkey divided in two, half in Europe and half in the Middle East, will not be able to succeed in its policies, whether of a regional or of a continental scale” [[132]].

In the geopolitical and geo–economic landscape of the Middle East, Davutoğlu places particular emphasis on the importance of the Mesopotamia – Basra axis: “The relation between Southern Mesopotamia, which is controlled by Iraq, and Northern Mesopotamia, has acquired new dimensions [...] A new link has been created, based on the balance of oil – water – oil. This balance is geographically located as follows: oil of the Caspian Sea, Basin of Mesopotamia and South–east Turkey (GAP), oil fields of Mosul and Basra” [[133]].

Considering the points of the suggestions made by the Turk Professor in relation to the “development and reinforcement of axes of co–operation (e.g. Turkey – Iran, etc.)”, the “radical revision of Turkey's policy in the Middle East” and the “flexibility in foreign policy”, in combination with his view that “Turkey's geopolitical location necessitates the planning of dynamic policies with many orientations, that are capable of utilising all sorts of options, and not of static policies, depending on the strategic priorities of various other actors, it is obvious that Mr. Davutoğlu proposes an extremely flexible relation between Ankara and Washington and, moreover, that he suggests that Ankara should specifically foster its strategic ties with Moscow, as well as with Iran, China and Syria. It will be absolutely clear for the readers of the Turk scholar's suggestions, that the “oil–water–oil” axis relates to (i) the oil and natural gas resources of the Russian “near abroad” and of Russia itself; (ii) the water of rivers Tigris and Euphrates, together with the complex of Dams and Watersheds of the Great Anatolian Project (GAP) [[134]]; and (iii) the oil resources of Mosul, Kirkuk –in Iraqi Kurdistan– and of Basra, in the Shiite South.

In short, using the nodal international actors of power, which are furthermore competitive, even hostile, towards the policy of Washington in the Middle East, and internationally. However, Mr. Davutoğlu's vision is to make Ankara an intermediary nodal actor, between Washington and the above–mentioned international actors, and thus to radically upgrade Turkey's geostrategic role, waiting for his country to receive the appropriate offsets from the US (See Map 1).

Who is really in danger from this package of American offsets in the Middle Eastern subsystem? The question is rhetorical. Naturally Greece, if it has failed to properly cultivate its relations with Israel in the meantime, and has not proceeded to the creation of crucial, as well as fruitful, co–operation schemes with Tel Aviv, in strategic sectors.

Above all, it must be stressed that it would not be a wise choice to offer Israel as “prey” to the expansive aspirations of Turkey. This holds particularly true, considering that the stability of Turkish–Israeli co–operations is now a thing of the past and that the presence of hydrocarbons in the region is the present and the future. A present and a future for Cyprus, for Greece and for Europe alike, as well as for the US, which would look forward to reducing the influence of the Arab–Muslim hydrocarbons on European foreign policies.

Consequently, the dominant strategic challenge for Athens should be a multi–faceted Greek foreign policy, utilising the Greek diplomatic trust in the Arab–Muslim world, as well as promoting rapidly its multilevel relations with Israel.

---

[1]
        Alexander Murinson. 2006. The Strategic depth doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy. Middle Eastern Studies. 42.6, 945–964.

[2]
        See a discussion on these movements, in: M. Ataman. 2000. Ozal and Turkish Ethnic Policy. Middle Eastern Studies. 34.4, 133, cited in: Alexander Murinson. 2006. The Strategic depth doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy. Middle Eastern Studies. 42.6, 945–964.

[3]

        Ibid.

[4]
 

        A. Bayramoğlu. 2004. Yeni Safak, cited in: M. Rubin. Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo–Ottomanism. National Review Online. 10 August 2004 <http://www.meforum.org/article/628>.

[5]
        This figure is derived from data of the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Germany's Constitution Protection Authority). Millî Görüş mentions more than 87,000 members (see: K. Gogos. 2011. Political Islam and Islamic networks in Germany. Geopolitical analysis. Athens: Livanis, 348–349 [in Greek]).

[6]
 

        Op. cit., M. Ataman. 2002. Ozal and Turkish Ethnic Policy. Middle Eastern Studies. 34.4.

[7]
 

        Cmp. “The 'Strategic Depth' that Turkey Needs, An Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu”. The Turkish Daily News. 15/09/2001.

[8]
        Op. cit.

[9]     See K. Gogos. 2005. Turkey and Central Asia: Geography and Geostrategy of Turkey. Geostratigiki. 7. Athens: Institute for Defence Analysis, 179–191 (in Greek).

[10]  N.B.: The Turk FM has proceeded to the stage of political suggestions, and therefore acts as a geostrategist rather than a geopolitician, whose role is to analyse the dynamic systemic reality.

[11]
 

        Cmp.: (i) I. Th. Mazis. 2008. Critique de la Géopolitique Critique ou bien Qui a peur de l’analyse géopolitique moderne?. Études Internationales (Tunis: Association of International Studies). 106, 140–153; (ii) I. Th. Mazis. 2002. La geopolitica contemporanea: basi e definizioni di metodo. Saggi di Geopolitica (Università degli Studi di Napoli–Federico II), 1–11; (iii) Ι. Th. Mazis. 2004. The new Geopolitical Reality and its Ideological Requirements. CRiSSMA Working Papers (Milano: Facoltà di Scienze Politiche del Università Cattolica di Sacro Quore, Centro di Ricerche sul Sistema Sud e il Mediterraneo Allargato/Research Centre on the Southern System and Wider Mediterranean). 2, 33–50.

[12]
 

        Cmp.: A. Davutoğlu. 2010. The Strategic Depth. Turkey's international position. Athens: Piotita, 22–23 (in Greek).

[13]
        See: A. Davutoğlu. 2010, op. cit., 32.

[14]
 

        A. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 7.

[15]  See: I. Th. Mazis. 2002. Geopolitics. Theory and Practice. Athens: ELIAMEP/Papazissis, 37 (in Greek).

[16]
 

        NB: We cannot designate this view as a “Theory of Power”, due to reasons of lack of scientific substantiation, as we have proven already and will continue to prove.

[17]
        James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 1992. Contending Theories of International Relations:A Comprehensive Survey. Volume A, 54 (Greek edition: Papazissis).

[18]

        N.B.: Our emphasis.

[19]  Ernst Haas. 1953. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?. World Politics. 5, 442. Our emphasis.

[20]  Op. cit., 445.

[21]
        Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World’s Politics, New York, 1942, pp. 21–25. In: Ernst Haas, op. cit., 450.

[22]  Op. cit.

[23]  Op. cit.

[24]
 

        L. Bücher, “Über politische Kunstausdrücke. II. Politisches Gleichgewicht”, Deutsche Revue, xii (1887), 336–338 . In: Haas, op. cit., 451.

[25]  Bücher, op. cit., 336, 338. In: Haas, op. cit., 451.

[26]  Haas remarks that “when Bolingbroke wrote that 'our Charles the First was no great politician, and yet he seemed to discern that the balance of power was turning in favour of France, some years before the treaty of Westphalia...', he was merely suggesting that the Stuart ruler was noticing that the power of France was increasing as compared to that of Britain” [see the footnote of Haas: Bollingbroke, Works, Philadelphia, 1841, II, 257. In: Ernst Haas, The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?, op. cit, 447].

[27]
 

        John Bassett Moore. 1924. International Law and Some Current Illusions, New York, 310.

[28]  See: (i) F. L. Schuman. 1941. International Politics, New York, 281ff; (ii) H. Morgenthau. 1948. Politics Among Nations, New York, 1948, passim; (iii) F. Ratzel. 1903. Politische Geographie. Munich, passim; and F. Ratzel. 2001.  Der Lebensraum (in Greek, preface/introduction: I. Th. Mazis, Athens: Proskinio–Sideratos), 52–56 and 124–134.

[29]  J.B. Moore. 1924. International Law and Some Current Illusions, New York, 310.

[30]  Ernst Haas. 1953. The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?. World Politics. 5, 452–453.

[31]
        Morgenthau, op. cit., passim. Also: F.L. Schuman. 1941. International Politics, New York, 281ff.

[32]

        Op. cit.

[33]  Op. cit.

[34]  J.J. Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l’ abbé de Saint–Pierre, cited in: Donnadieu, op. cit., 9–10.

[35]
        Op. cit., 453.

[36]  F. Ratzel. 1903. Politische Geographie, Munich, cited in: Kaeber, E. 1906. Die Idee des Europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 4.

[37]  L. Donnadieu. 1900. Essai sur la théorie d’ équilibre, xx. See also the description by Sir Eyre Crowe in a famous state document of 1907, in which the approach of “world law” prevails.

[38]
 

        Haas, op. cit.

[39]  Op. cit.

[40]  Op. cit., 454.

[41]
 

        A. Sorel. 1908. L’ Europe et la Révolution française, Paris, 19–20, 30–35.

[42]
        Ernst Haas, op. cit., 455.

[43]  Friedrich Ratzel, Der Lebensraum, op. cit.

[44]  Friedrich Ratzel. 1903. Politische Geographie. München, 3. In: Friedrich Ratzel. 1988. Géographie Politique (Charles Hussy, dir.). Paris: Economica, 42.

[45]
 

        N.B.. This term is, in my opinion, more accurate than “belt”. We refer to the greater space extending on both sides of the “borderline” (“political frontiers”, or simply, “frontiers”).

[46]  A. Davutoğlu. 2010. The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 50–51 (in Greek) (2001/2004. Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları).

[47]  See: A. Davutoğlu, The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 52–53.

[48]
 

        Op. cit., 53.

[49]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, The Strategic Depth..., op. cit.

[50]  Regrettably, the Greek translator has transferred the notion of the Zone of the Axis (or Central Earth) as “hinterland”. The question is: whose “hinterland”? I therefore reject this term and propose the terminology I had proposed already in the editing of the Greek translation of N. J. Spykman's The Geography of the Peace (Athens, 2004, 15ff).

[51]  Regrettably, the Greek translator has transferred the notion of Rimland as “Perimeter”. The question is: “Perimeter” of what? My proposed rendition corresponds to the English term scaffolding, since this is the function perceived by Spykman. See: N. J. Spykman. The Geography of the Peace. Edited by I. Th. Mazis (Athens, 2004, 15ff).

[52]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 179.

[53]
        The perspective of a control, by Turkey, of the “Axis of the Aegean – Eastern Mediterranean”, as proposed by Mr. Erdoğan's Advisor, leaves no margin for misunderstandings by Greece... Besides, his recent allegations on a “Kastelorizo of the Mediterranean” (11–12 March, Athens) bear proof to this remark!

[54]  N.B.: Therefore, according to Mr. Davutoğlu, the Aegean–Cyprus zone, should be controlled as a foundation of Turkey's foreign policy. No further evidence is required!

[55]  N.B. The author has corrected the original text. The relations between Turkey and Iraq have been corresponded, as appropriate, to the Mesopotamia – Basra axis, and those between Turkey and Syria, to the axis of Eastern Mediterranean. In the original, these correspondences seem to have been inadvertently reversed.

[56]
 

        Α. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, 398.

[57]
        N.B. We have already shown (II.1.1) that the reference to the geostrategic interest of Turkey in Russia, China and Iran is clearly a Haushoferian reference.

[58]  Op. cit., 492–3.

[59]

        Op. cit. See also Mahan's view in: A. Westcott. 1948. Mahan On Naval Warfare, Boston: Little, Brown, 77.

[60]
        Cmp. L. Massignon. 1959. L'Umma et ses synonymes: notion de communauté sociale en Islam. REI (1941–1946), 151ff.

[61]  A. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 8.

[62]
        Op. cit.

[63]

        N.B.: The Turk scholar avoids the designation “Ecumenical” and rejects the Patriarchate's ecumenical role for Orthodox Christians, all over the world.

[64]  A. Davutoğlu, The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 201.

[65]
        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit.

[66]
        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 202.

[67]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 202.

[68]  Op. cit., 235.

[69]
 

        N.B.: An extremely... “delicate” and “peaceful” approach!

[70]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 235.

[71]  A. Davutoğlu. 2004. Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 174.

[72]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 175.

[73]
        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit.

[74]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 176.

[75]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 178.

[76]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 179.

[77]  A. Davutoğlu,op. cit., 179.

[78]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 180.

[79]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 202 (Greek edition).

[80]

        N.B. This is a really impressive example, for its barbarity and its arbitrariness. Davutoğlu, of course, sees it differently!

[81]
        A. Davutoğlu, The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 201.

[82]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 215.

[83]  A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 216.

[84]
 

        As rightly remarks K. Nikolaou–Patragas (personal discussion with the author), “Davutoğlu, when referring to the Umma as an 'imaginary entity', he aligns himself, inadvertently perhaps, with the most extreme and inflexible post–modernists, and more specifically, the social anthropologists among them, who seem to ignore the Islamic dogma and approach Islam in an erroneous manner, as simply conforming with the requirements of their mental construct. This is, however, an utmost blasphemy against Islam, and it is difficult to find another blasphemy of this magnitude. even in studies of old–school Orientalists who, despite their theoretical deficiencies (see: K. Nikolaou–Patragas. 2011. The Methodological Perception of Islam. Civitas Gentium. 1.1, 79–86 [in Greek ]), do not misrepresent the truth. This argument by Davutoğlu is an insult for the members of the Umma worldwide, who are inspired by the strong belief that they are an integral part of this Community of the Faithful, joined by their belief in God's message, as revealed by the Prophet, the exact preservation of which will give them the Kingdom of Heaven. Therefore, given that the Pillars of Islam are common for all, and are exercised in an identical manner, with the eyes turned towards one, unique and stable centre, the Holy Town of Mecca, any “imaginary” perception, such as that of Davutoğlu, of this unique Community of the consciousness, is at least a blasphemy”.

[85]  A. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 7.

[86]
        Cmp. A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 220–221.

[87]
 

        N.B. (I.Th. Mazis): We should stress the difference of the term “Islamist”, which relates to the conversion of Islam, from its religious ontology, into a political and ideological imaginary hermeneutic. See: I. Th. Mazis. 2002. Geography of the Islamist Movement in the Middle East. 2nd edition. Athens: Papazissis (in Greek).

[88]  Gamal al–Banna. 2003. Al–Islam din wa umma wa laisa din wa doula (Islam is Religion and Community, not Religion and State). Cairo (for the translation of pertinent concepts and extracts of this work [translator's note: from Arabic into Greek], I must thank Dr. Kyriakos Nikolaou–Patragas). Cf. also: K. Nikolaou–Patragas. 2009. The deterrence of class consciousness in Islam.  Analekta (edition of the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Patriarchal Library of Alexandria). 9, 89 ff (in Greek).

[89]  See: I. Th. Mazis, Geography of the Islamist Movement in the Middle East., op. cit., 41 (in Greek).

[90]
 

        N.B. (I. Mazis): Our emphasis. This is a particularly important remark nowadays, that we are witnessing the domino of uprisings in the Middle East and Maghreb and there is an abundance of thorough and detailed analyses about “democratisation”, etc.

[91]  A. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 7.

[92]
 

        Cf. K. Nikolaou–Patragas. 2006. Islam and Ethnism. O Politis. 142, 28 ff (in Greek).

[93]
        Cf. K. Nikolaou–Patragas. 2011. Caliphate and Islamic Governance. Athens: Herodotus (in Greek).

[94]  N.B.: Author's terminology.

[95]

        Garaudy's arguments and their counter–argumentation from a Marxist perspective can be found in: Farida al–Nakash. 2006. On the edge of modernity. Cairo, 241 ff. (in Arabic; the translation of useful concepts and extracts [translator's note: from Arabic into Greek] was carried out by Dr. K. Nikolaou–Patragas).

[96]
        Op. cit. The previous American involvement in Sudan and the current occupation of Iraq can definitely provide a basis for substantiating this argument.

[97]  A. Davutoğlu. 2001. It’s only natural. Al–Ahram Weekly. 564. Also: Α. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 8–9.

[98]  This argument is expressed in: Muhammad Sa'id al–'Ashmawi. 2004. Al Islam ou al–siasa. Beirut. More generally, for the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, see: Refaat al–Said. 2004. Armed terrorism. Why, when and towards what. Cairo (in Arabic). Also, idem.: (i) 2004. The armed Sheikh. Cairo (in Arabic); (ii) 2004. The Islam–likes deriving from the Brothers. Cairo (in Arabic). On the positions of the Brothers, as a model for the Islamist organisations around the world, see (iii) idem. 2006. Political Islam. The organisation of the Brotherhood as a Model. Cairo (in Arabic); (iv) idem. 1999. Hasan al–Banna: When, how, why?. History of the Egyptians. 147. (in Arabic). (The translation of useful concepts and extracts [translator's note: from Arabic into Greek] was carried out by Dr. K. Nikolaou–Patragas). Cf. also: K. Nikolaou–Patragas. 2009. Tribalism and modern Islamist movement. Alexandrinos Amitos (in honour of I.M. Hatziphotis), 3.b. Alexandria, 169 ff (in Greek).

[99]
 

        A. Davutoğlu. 2001. It’s only natural. Al–Ahram Weekly. 564. Also: Α. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 8–9.

[100]        A. Davutoğlu. 2001. It’s only natural. Al–Ahram Weekly. 564. Also: Α. Davutoğlu. 1998. The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 2.4, 1. See also: W. Thomson. 1988. On Global War: Historical–Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 8–9.

[101]        Α. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, op. cit., 486–500.

[102]
 

        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 487, with an ephasis on the contrast between “static” and “dynamic”.

[103]        See: K. Gogos. 2005. “Turkey and Central Asia: Geography and Geostrategy of Turkey”. Geostrategiki. (Defence Analyses Institute), 7. Athens, 179–191, esp. 184–189.

[104]        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 487–489.

[105]        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 488.

[106]
        See: I. Th. Mazis (editorship and presentation). 2001. F. Ratzel. Der Lebensraum. Athens: Proskinio.

[107]

        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit. 489.

[108]
        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 490–1.

[109]        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 491. Indeed, Davutoğlu cites as a typical example of micro–strategy and of lack of co–ordination, the internal crisis in Azerbaijan, when Turkey was dominated by biased views and differentiations of government officials, something that caused damage for Turkey.

[110]        See: I. Iliopoulos. 2005. Turkey as a model for the Muslim republics of the former USSR. History, political use and real dimension of a propagated myth. Geostratigiki (Defence Analyses Institute, Athens), 143–190, esp. 144 (in Greek).

[111]        Note by Iliopoulos: “Europa–Archiv”, Folge 22/1992, Z277, 30–31/10/1992.

[112]        Op. cit.: “Politische Berichte”, 8/1992, 10/4/1992.

[113]        I. Iliopoulos, op. cit., 144.

[114]
 

        Also: A. D. White Professor–at Large (Cornell University), at Harvard, etc.

[115]        Tibi, Bassam. 1998. Aufbruch am Bosporus. Die Türkei zwischen Europa und dem Islamismus. München/Zürich: Diana Verlag, 69.

[116]        Tibi, Bassam, Aufbruch am Bosporus. Die Türkei...,op. cit., 71

[117]        Tibi, Bassam, Aufbruch am Bosporus. Die Türkei..., op. cit., 78–79.

[118]        Tibi, Bassam, Aufbruch am Bosporus. Die Türkei..., op. cit., 335.

[119]
 

        Α. Davutoğlu. The Strategic Depth..., op. cit., 382.

[120]        N.B. It is not a counter–cultural, a force that is generally contrary to civilisation, as the Greek translator asserts.

[121]        Op. cit., 382.

[122]
 

        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 497–8.

[123]        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 499.

[124]        Α. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 559.

[125]
 

        Α. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, op. cit., 559.

[126]
        K. Gogos, 2005. Turkey and Central Asia: Geography and Geostrategy of Turkey. Geostratigiki, 7. Athens: Defence Analyses Institute, 179–191 (in Greek).

[127]        Davutoğlu considers that “during the Cold War, the main geostrategic characteristics of the Middle East were the following: (i) the ideologically formed geo–cultural bipolarity; (ii) the geo–economic formation of the region, on the axis of oil; (iii) the separation of geopolitical limits that was reflected by the worldwide strategic rivalry; (v) the field of cultural and political conflict within the Middle East that was born with the establishment of the state of Israel and that is gradually escalating” (ibid., 135). Consequently, for Davutoğlu, perhaps the state of Israel should not have been established. It is a rather “inelegant” and “disturbing” view for Tel Aviv...

[128]        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 142

[129]        Cf. Nikos Psirroukis. 1980. Neo–colonialism. Anatomy of the modern world. Athens: Herodotos (in Greek).

[130]        Ralph Peters. 2006. Blood Borders. Armed Forces Journal.

         ; and I.Th. Mazis. 2008. Geopolitics of the Greater Middle East and Turkey. Athens: Livanis (in Greek).

[131]
 

        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit.

[132]
        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 142.

[133]        A. Davutoğlu, op. cit., 399–400.

[134]

        Mazis, I. Th. 2000. Geopolitics of water in the Middle East. Arab countries, Israel, Turkey. Second edition. Athens: Papazissis (in Greek).