In the aftermath of the July 15 abortive coup attempt,
four major purges on July 27, July 30, Sept. 2 and Sept. 7 dismissed thousands
of officers and noncommissioned officers from the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
Since then, speculation has been rife on how these purges have affected the TSK’s combat
effectiveness and on whether there will be problems filling critical posts.
Metin Gurcan is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. He served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser between 2002-2008. Resigned from the military, he is now an Istanbul-based independent security analyst. Gurcan obtained his PhD in May 2016, with a dissertation on changes in the Turkish military over the last decade. He has been published extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals and has a book forthcoming in August 2016 titled “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan: Understanding Counterinsurgency in Tribalized, Rural, Muslim Environments.” On Twitter:
On Sept. 8, for the first time since the purges, the
official website of the chief of staff provided a breakdown on the TSK personnel
changes.
According to the figures given, today, about 351,000
personnel are serving in theTurkish army, navy and air force: 206 generals, 29,949 officers, 67,476 noncommissioned
officers (NCO), 48,879 specialist soldiers, 15,888 contractual soldiers and
188,611 conscripts. Accordingly, 46% of the TSK are professionals, while 54%
are conscripts.
When we compare these numbers with the March 2016 figures, we see a 38% reduction in the number of generals, which then numbered 325
in three branches and an 8% reduction from 32,451 officers. There were no major
changes in other ranks.
Dismissals after July 15 have mostly affected
brigadier generals and rear admirals. As the TSK maintains a huge pool of
colonels, it will not be hard to fill those vacancies. Brigadier generals who
were dismissed in August were rapidly replaced. Colonels were quickly promoted
and posted to critical brigades in the east and southeast, while others are
serving as acting commanders in the western brigades. There were 27 major
generals and seven lieutenant generals dismissed and replaced in August. In
sum, all dismissed generals have been replaced and there are no shortages.
The officer group most affected by dismissals is the
air force combat pilots. The TSK has 321 warplanes, 240 of them F-16s. In
March, Turkey's air force, the TAF, had 600 active pilots. After the dismissals
of about 280 of them, there are now about 300 combat pilots available. Before
July 15, there were nearly two pilots for each warplane. This figure is now down to 0.8.
Meanwhile, investigations into many combat pilots
continue, raising the prospect of more dismissals.
How will the TAF meet its pilot needs? There is a
three-pronged approach to this critical problem. First, the 15-year compulsory service of combat pilots may be raised to
18 years. There is also a plan to recruit sophomore and junior university students
from the departments of industrial engineering, electronics, aeronautics, space
sciences and computer sciences to the Air Force Academy and to train them as
combat pilots in an accelerated two-year program. Finally, the government has
issued a call inviting pilots who have left the service and are now mostly
working for civilian airlines to return to the TAF. There are reports that 140 former combat pilots
are preparing to return to service.
With these measures, the combat pilot deficit can be
overcome within two years. But between now and September 2018, the current crop
of combat pilots will be working hard, with much overtime and longer rotations.
Also to be noted are the dismissals of about 30 pilots
of the 10th Tanker Squadron based at Incirlik Air Base that provides aerial
refueling of combat planes. This will likely affect the aerial refueling
capacity of the TAF for the time being.
Another group affected by the dismissals is the army's
helicopter pilots. About 20 of them, including assault helicopter pilots, have
been dismissed. Their absence means a much heavier workload for the army
pilots, who have major tasks in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK).
Among the dismissals are a disproportionate number of
battalion and team commanders in the special forces, from the navy’s elite
Underwater Assault Unit and the TAF’s Combat Search and Rescue personnel.
Many special forces battalion commanders and team
leaders were arrested and dismissed from service on charges of participating in
the coup. Similarly, there are reports of dismissals of a high number of
helicopter pilots and other officers and NCOs serving in TAF’s elite Search and
Rescue teams. The coup attempt cost the elite units of the TSK dearly.
In the army, most of the dismissals are from the Chief
of Staff headquarters and Land Forces Command in Ankara and from units in
Istanbul. The second army command responsible for combating terror in the
southeast, border security with Syria and the current Operation Euphrates Shield has suffered the
least. About 20 brigades of the second army command are now operationally
active with their new commanders.
In the navy, most of the dismissals are from the
command offices in Ankara or personnel serving in rear headquarters. The navy
has been the least affected branch.
In light of this information, it is clear that the
most affected are the TAF's combat and tanker pilots and then the Special
Forces Command, the Land Force's aviation units and finally the navy's
headquarters personnel.
Although the TSK appears to be coping with the effects
of the dismissals, no one can deny that the special forces units, underwater
assault teams and TAF search and rescue teams will need at least a year — for
the TAF, a minimum of two — to restore their personnel numbers to pre-July 15
levels.
But sources speaking to Al-Monitor in Ankara note that
morale and motivation in the TSK have risen significantly with Operation
Euphrates Shield that began Aug. 24. They said they were gratified that so many
officers and NCOs cut their leaves short or did not take the leave they were
due and volunteered for combat service.
Among the TSK personnel now detained, there are scores
who were not involved in the coup attempt. Concluding their investigations could further increase the number of
available officers.
In short, the depletion of air combat and helicopter
pilots and special forces personnel has adversely affected the combat strength
of the TSK, but it is generally felt that the high motivation of the remaining
personnel can make up for the numerical decline. It is fortunate that the
second army, which is fighting the PKK, maintaining border security with Syria
and participating in Euphrates Shield, has been the least affected command. But
at the end of the day, the TSK will need at least two years to recover from the
losses inflicted by the coup attempt and the consequent purges.
Metin Gurcan is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. He served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser between 2002-2008. Resigned from the military, he is now an Istanbul-based independent security analyst. Gurcan obtained his PhD in May 2016, with a dissertation on changes in the Turkish military over the last decade. He has been published extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals and has a book forthcoming in August 2016 titled “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan: Understanding Counterinsurgency in Tribalized, Rural, Muslim Environments.” On Twitter:
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