FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Nicosia Holds the Keys to Syria, the
Migrant Crisis, and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean
On a recent December day, people
strolling the seaside boardwalk in the Cypriot city of Limassol had their peaceful
afternoon suddenly interrupted. Overhead, a brace of British warplanes roared
from their base at nearby RAF Akrotiri, flew low over the eastern
Mediterranean, and headed for Syria, just 100 miles away.
This was the second time the
boardwalk was shaken by warplanes that day. Earlier, onlookers had also
witnessed Israeli warplanes flying overhead during exercises. In the harbor
beneath them, Russian warships lay at anchor, refueling
on their way east. Later, too, a Limassol-based seismic research vessel,
chartered by a U.S. company, sent frantic radio messages to say it had been
intercepted and then shadowed by a Turkish frigate.
All the (now apparently routine)
military activity is a visible reminder that Cyprus, the European Union’s far-flung Levantine outpost, is once again at the heart
of a Gordian knot of regional conflicts and conundrums. These range from the
Syrian refugee crisis to Israeli oil and gas development; from Turkey’s
accession to the European Union to Russia’s growing role in the Middle East. Lebanon and Egypt feature in the mix, too, as do
maritime boundary disputes between Greece and Turkey.
All these issues run through
Nicosia, Cyprus’ divided capital, where UN-sponsored talks aimed at reuniting
Greek and Turkish Cypriots are now entering year 52. It is, perhaps
surprisingly, the success or failure of these seemingly endless talks that is
increasingly vital for the resolution of the host of other overlapping and
interlinked regional dilemmas.
GAS TROUBLE
The interconnection between the
dispute over Cyprus and the region’s other dilemmas was most recently
highlighted in late December by reports of a new rapprochement between Turkey
and Israel. Under the reported terms of renewed relations (on hold since
2010), the two
countries may start looking again at running a natural gas pipeline between
them, which would link newly discovered Israeli offshore gas fields to Turkey,
a country with a growing demand for energy but without much in the way of
hydrocarbons itself.
A quick look at the map, however,
demonstrates the problem with such an idea—and why Cyprus may be key to its
solution. South of the island, at the extremity of its 200-mile maritime
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), lies Cyprus’ undeveloped Aphrodite natural gas field. Just adjacent to this lies the
undeveloped Israeli Leviathan field, and farther to the southwest, Egyptian gas
fields stretch along that country’s North African coast.
Any undersea link between Israel and
Turkey would have to either pass through Lebanese and Syrian waters or cross
the Cypriot EEZ. The first alternative is obviously fraught with difficulties.
Aside from the ongoing conflict in Syria, Israel and Lebanon have still not
agreed to final maritime boundaries. A delimitation treaty between Cyprus,
Israel, and Lebanon remains unratified by the Lebanese parliament.
Yet the alternative has major
problems, too. Specifically, the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey remain hostile,
and the development of a pipeline through the region would also touch on
Cyprus’ own plans for exploiting the Aphrodite field.
Ankara does not recognize the
government of the Republic of Cyprus, which has been composed almost entirely
of Greek Cypriots since intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
broke out on the island in 1964. Instead, Turkey, which invaded Cyprus in 1974,
is the only country in the world that recognizes a breakaway state in the
northern third of the island—the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC)—which is composed almost entirely of Turkish Cypriots and covers the
territory conquered by the invading Turkish troops. Turkey still maintains some
30,000 soldiers in the north, which is separated from the territory controlled
by the Republic of Cyprus by a UN-patrolled buffer zone. Likewise, the Republic
of Cyprus refuses to recognize either the TRNC or open relations with Turkey.
One outcome of the dispute has been
the lack of any agreement between Cyprus and Turkey on maritime boundaries,
with the TRNC also recently claiming offshore rights and a share of Aphrodite
and of any other future discoveries. The bickering has hampered oil and gas
exploration in much of the eastern Mediterranean, instantly heightening
tensions whenever a survey ship leaves port.
In other words, it is highly
unlikely that Cyprus, which enjoys international recognition and EU membership,
will allow a pipeline to Turkey across its EEZ. At the same time, the country
faces a problem in developing its gas resources without Turkey’s apparent partner,
Israel.
Cyprus is just too small a market,
and too far away from the modest-sized Aphrodite field, to warrant an expensive
pipeline. Experts have suggested that a more economically viable alternative
would be to combine Aphrodite with the nearby Leviathan field and then send gas
from both down a shorter pipeline to Egypt, where it could be converted into
liquefied natural gas at two currently unused terminals and then exported.
Cyprus has thus been keen on closer
ties with Israel—especially after Israel’s relations with Turkey took a
nosedive back in 2010—hence the Israeli jets flying over Limassol.
Despite the apparent alignment of
interests, however, the two countries have made little progress sealing a gas
deal. Long-running negotiations on an all-important deal that would pool the
two gas fields’ resources have dragged on without result. The endless talks had
long puzzled Cypriots, yet perhaps the recent announcement of an
Israeli-Turkish rapprochement offers a clue to Israeli reluctance to sign on to
anything: Tel Aviv has been all too conscious of the effect that dealing with
the Greek Cypriots might have on its future relations with Turkey, which has
historically been a far more important strategic partner.
EUROPEAN DISUNION
The lack of diplomatic relations
between Cyprus and Turkey is also a major spanner in the works when it comes to
Turkish-EU relations, which were recently revitalized by the EU’s panicky
reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis.
Since Turkey began EU accession
negotiations
back in 2005, it has gotten almost nowhere. Croatia, which began the process at
the same time, joined in 2013. Although there are many factors, one of the
principal holdups is that Cyprus has blocked the process.
And so, when EU officials declared
that under a new arrangement with Turkey, Ankara would undertake to halt Syrian
refugees entering the EU in return for financial aid, a liberalized visa regime,
and a reinvigoration of the accession process, it raised Greek Cypriot
eyebrows. There have been no indications so far, either, that the Republic of
Cyprus, which can still effectively block various parts of the accession
process, will allow a new opening to happen. Meanwhile, Ankara has declared
that whatever new arrangements are made with Brussels, none of them will apply
to its relations with Cyprus, despite its EU membership.
It could be argued that the Turkish
accession process is, in any case, something of a pantomime, given fundamental
French and German objections to Turkish membership. At any rate, it remains to
be seen how the continued Cypriot block will impact the implementation of the
Syrian refugee deal.
Hostile nonrecognition between Turkey
and Cyprus also figures into a further dispute—that between Greece and Turkey
over maritime boundaries in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. The borders
have never been formalized, which causes considerable tensions as well as mock
dogfights between the two countries’ fighter jets and, more recently,
complications for Greek and Turkish coast guards seeking to control the flow of
refugees and migrants.
Settlement of the boundary between
Greece and Turkey involves determining the western limits of Cyprus’ maritime
area, as this intersects with those of the other two countries. Currently,
whereas Greece recognizes Cyprus’ boundaries, Turkey does not—a reason behind
the recent shadowing of the Limassol-based research ship.
NO PROBLEM
Many of the region’s problems,
however, could go away if the current UN-sponsored talks on reunifying Cyprus
succeed. A settlement, which would have to be agreed upon via an islandwide
referendum, would see Turkey recognizing the new, bicommunal Cypriot
government, and vice versa—a key to unlocking the closed doors. And so, U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry, French President François Hollande, British
Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi all
visited the island in December to give their official support to a deal.
Prospects for an agreement are
widely seen as being better now than at any time in the last ten years. This is
largely because this time, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders—Nicos
Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci—are known to be committed to finding a
solution, a rarity in Cypriot negotiations. There is even some talk of a
referendum in the spring of 2016, although this is likely overly optimistic.
Key to such a referendum succeeding,
though, may be Russia, whose foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, also visited the
area in December, back-to-back with Kerry. Russia enjoys both a Christian
Orthodox connection to the Greek Cypriots and a historic link to the large,
pro-Moscow Greek Cypriot former communist party, AKEL, whose approval of any
settlement would be vital.
Further, although Greek Cypriots are
in myriad ways anchored to the West and are themselves EU citizens, many also
have a highly favorable view of Moscow. Scores of Russians have invested in or
settled in the republic, remaining there despite losing out in the 2013
financial crisis. Indeed, a recent poll showed that a majority of Greek
Cypriots favor granting Russia some military facilities on the island, with
around a third supporting granting Moscow similar bases to those the British
warplanes have been using to bomb Syria.
At the same time, of course,
Russia’s relations with Turkey have seldom been worse. And the back-to-back
visits from Kerry and Lavrov raised another aspect of the current knot of
problems: the continuing rivalry between Moscow and the West for regional
influence, heightened by recent Russian intervention in Syria.
For its part, the United States has given greater priority to the current talks than on many
previous occasions (Vice President Joe Biden has also been a recent visitor to
the island). Yet for all the heavy diplomatic guns being lined up behind an
agreement, ultimately, it will come down to a referendum of the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots.
And there, considerable obstacles remain, with key issues
over security and property still to be resolved. Meanwhile, the issue of
reunification remains extremely emotional in both communities. The last time
the UN held a similar referendum, in 2004, Turkish Cypriots voted for the deal
and Greek Cypriots against—by a large margin. This time around, the stakes are
even higher, with the future of gas wells to refugees hanging on which box the
Cypriots end up ticking.
There will never be a negotiated solution. Deal with it.
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