Σύμφωνα με τον κ. Βαρουφάκη, οι τραπεζικοί περιορισμοί επιβλήθηκαν στην Ελλάδα για να αναγκαστεί η κυβέρνηση να συνθηκολογήσει στις αποτυχημένες πολιτικές της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, γι' αυτό και μέσα από το άρθρο του εξαπολύει σφοδρή επίθεση στους Ευρωπαίους.
Ο τέως ΥΠΟΙΚ ξεκινά το άρθρο του με ένα παράδειγμα ενός καταθέτη στην... Αριζόνα.
«Φανταστείτε το παράδειγμα ενός καταθέτη στην Αριζόνα, ο οποίος επιτρέπεται να κάνει ανάληψη μόνο μικρών χρηματικών ποσών κάθε βδομάδα και αντιμετωπίζει περιορισμούς σχετικά με το πόσα χρήματα θα μπορούσε να τραβήξει σε τραπεζικό λογαριασμό στην Καλιφόρνια. Οι εν λόγω έλεγχοι κεφαλαίων, αν ποτέ έρθουν, θα σημάνουν το τέλος του δολαρίου ως ένα ενιαίου νομίσματος, διότι τα εν λόγω capital controls είναι εντελώς ασύμβατα με μια νομισματική ένωση», γράφει.
Κατά τον κ. Βαρουφάκη, η Ελλάδα σήμερα και η Κύπρος πριν από αυτή, προσφέρει μια περιπτωσιολογική μελέτη για το πώς οι έλεγχοι κεφαλαίου διακλαδώνουν ένα νόμισμα και στρεβλώνουν τα επιχειρηματικά κίνητρα.
«Η διαδικασία είναι απλή. Μόλις οι καταθέσεις σε ευρώ φυλακίζονται μέσα σε ένα εθνικό τραπεζικό σύστημα, το νόμισμα χωρίζεται ουσιαστικά σε δύο: τράπεζα ευρώ (BE) και το χαρτί, ή δωρεάν ευρώ», υποστηρίζει, σημειώνοντας πως ξαφνικά αναδύεται μια άτυπη συναλλαγματική ισοτιμία μεταξύ των δύο νομισμάτων.
«Σκεφτείτε έναν Έλληνα καταθέτη να επιθυμεί να μετατρέψει ένα μεγάλο ποσό της ΒΕ σε FE (ας πούμε, να πληρώσει για τις ιατρικές δαπάνες στο εξωτερικό, ή να ξεπληρώσει ένα χρέος της εταιρείας σε μια μη-Ελληνική οντότητα). Υποθέτοντας ότι καταθέτες βρίσκουν πρόθυμους κατόχους FE, οι οποίοι επιθυμούν να αγοράσουν τα BE τους, τότε προκύπτει μια ουσιαστική ΒΕ-FE συναλλαγματικών ισοτιμιών, που ποικίλει ανάλογα με το μέγεθος της συναλλαγής, με τους κατόχους της BE να έχουν μια σχετική ανυπομονησία για το πόσο θα διαρκέσουν τα capital controls», συνεχίζει.
«Στις 18 Αυγούστου του 2015, λίγες εβδομάδες μετά που τραβήχτηκε το βύσμα από τις τράπεζες στην Ελλάδα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα και το ελληνικό υποκατάστημα της, η Τράπεζα της Ελλάδα, στην πραγματικότητα επισημοποιήσαν ένα νομισματικό καθεστώς διπλού νομίσματος», προσθέτει.
Το άρθρο του Γιάνη Βαρουφάκη
![](http://www.protothema.gr/files/1/2016/01/08/varoyfakis%20fff.png)
http://www.protothema.gr/economy/article/542798/varoufakis-stin-ellada-kukloforoun-idi-duo-nomismata/
![A European Union (L) and a Greek national flag flutter in front of the Parthenon temple in Athens January 20, 2015. An early national election will be held on January 25 after the Greek parliament failed to elect a president. REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis (GREECE - Tags: POLITICS ELECTIONS TRAVEL SOCIETY) - RTR4M43G](https://agenda.weforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/RTR4M43G-628x330.jpg)
How Greece became a dual-currency economy
This article is published in collaboration with Project Syndicate.
Publication does not imply endorsement of views by the World Economic Forum.
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Author: Yanis Varoufakis, a former finance minister of Greece, is Professor of Economics at the University of Athens.
Image: A European Union (L) and a Greek national flag flutter in front of the Parthenon temple in Athens. REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis.
Imagine a depositor
in the US state of Arizona being permitted to withdraw only small
amounts of cash weekly and facing restrictions on how much money he or
she could wire to a bank account in California. Such capital controls,
if they ever came about, would spell the end of the dollar as a single
currency, because such constraints are utterly incompatible with a
monetary union.
Greece today (and
Cyprus before it) offers a case study of how capital controls bifurcate a
currency and distort business incentives. The process is
straightforward. Once euro deposits are imprisoned within a national
banking system, the currency essentially splits in two: bank euros (BE)
and paper, or free, euros (FE). Suddenly, an informal exchange rate
between the two currencies emerges.
Consider a Greek
depositor keen to convert a large sum of BE into FE (say, to pay for
medical expenses abroad, or to repay a company debt to a non-Greek
entity). Assuming such depositors find FE holders willing to purchase
their BE, a substantial BE-FE exchange rate emerges, varying with the
size of the transaction, BE holders’ relative impatience, and the
expected duration of capital controls.
On August 18, 2015, a
few weeks after pulling the plug from Greece’s banks (thus making
capital controls inevitable), the European Central Bank and its Greek
branch, the Bank of Greece, actually formalized a dual-currency currency
regime. A government decree stated that “Transfer of the early,
partial, or total prepayment of a loan in a credit institution is
prohibited, excluding repayment by cash or remittance from abroad.”
The eurozone
authorities thus permitted Greek banks to deny their customers the right
to repay loans or mortgages in BE, thereby boosting the effective BE-FE
exchange rate. And, by continuing to allow payments of tax arrears to
be made in BE, while prescribing FE as a separate, harder currency
uniquely able to extinguish commercial bank debt, Europe’s authorities
acknowledged that Greece now has two euros.
The real effects of
the dual-currency regime on Greece’s economy and society can be gleaned
only from the pernicious interaction between the capital controls and
the “reforms” (essentially tax hikes, pension reductions, and other
contractionary measures) imposed on the country by the eurozone
authorities. Consider the following beguiling example.
Greece’s companies
fall roughly into two categories. In one category are a large number of
small firms asphyxiating under the tax office’s demand that they pay in
advance, and immediately, 100% of next year’s corporate tax (as
estimated by the tax authorities). The second group comprises listed
companies whose depressed turnover jeopardizes their already diminished
share value and their standing with banks, suppliers, and potential
customers (all of which are reluctant to sign long-term contracts with
an underperforming company).
The coexistence, in
the same depressed economy, of these two types of businesses gives rise
to unexpected opportunities for shadowy trades without which countless
businesses might close their doors permanently. One widespread practice
involves two such firms, say, Micro (a small family firm facing a large
advance tax payment) and Macro (a publicly traded limited liability
company that needs to demonstrate higher turnover than it has).
Macro agrees to issue
invoices for (non-existent) goods or services rendered to Micro, up to,
say, €20,000 ($22,000). Micro agrees to pay €24,600 into Macro’s bank
account (the price plus 23% value-added tax) on the understanding that
Macro will reimburse the €20,000 to Micro. This way, at a cost of
€4,600, Micro reduces its taxable revenue by €24,600, while Macro boosts
its turnover figure by €20,000.
Alas, due to capital
controls, Macro cannot reimburse Micro in FE, nor can it wire €20,000 to
Micro’s BE bank account (lest they be found out by the authorities).
So, to seal the deal, Micro and Macro approach a cash-rich vendor. This
is usually a gas-station owner who is flush with cash at the end of each
day and who, for security reasons and in order to pay for his fuel
supplies, is obliged to deposit his cash daily at his bank, turning
valuable FEs into less valuable BEs. The mutually beneficial deal is
completed when Macro wires €20,000 in BE to the gas-station owner, who
then hands over a smaller sum of FE (cash) to Micro’s owner, pocketing
the difference.
The fact that this
informal deal benefits all sides exposes the terrible inefficiency of
current fiscal policy (namely, punitive business taxes) and how capital
controls magnify it. The state collects additional VAT from Micro (at a
loss of corporate taxes that Micro cannot pay anyway); Macro enjoys the
benefits of seemingly higher turnover; and the gas-station owner reduces
his losses from converting FE into BE. The downside is that economic
activity is overstated and, more important, that reform becomes even
harder as entrepreneurs internalize the necessity to find new, creative
ways of bending the rules.
The sole purpose of
the capital controls imposed on Greece last summer was to force the
country’s rebellious government to capitulate to the eurozone’s failed
policies. But an unintended consequence was the formalization of two
parallel (euro-denominated) currencies. Combined with the punitive
taxation caused by Europe’s refusal to recognize the unsustainability of
Greek public debt, the dual-currency regime produces unforeseen
incentives for informal transactions in a country that desperately needs
to defeat informality.
The reality of
Greece’s two currencies is the most vivid demonstration yet of the
fragmentation of Europe’s monetary “union.” In comparison, Arizona has
never looked so good.
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Author: Yanis Varoufakis, a former finance minister of Greece, is Professor of Economics at the University of Athens.
Image: A European Union (L) and a Greek national flag flutter in front of the Parthenon temple in Athens. REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis.