The Economist: Turkey and the PKK: A never-ending fight

The Turkish army continues its long battle with Kurdish rebels

May 20th 2010 | KANDIL, NORTHERN IRAQ | From The Economist print edition

IN TURKEY’S rugged south-east, giant portraits of Ataturk stare down from the mountains at rebellious Kurds. In the Kandil mountains, where the Iraqi and Iranian borders meet, images of Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), loom over land controlled by the rebels. The PKK has been ensconced here for over two decades. And Turkey’s army, NATO’s second-biggest, has been trying to dislodge it ever since.
Over the past month clashes between the army and the PKK have escalated. Hundreds of Kurds have flocked to the conflict zone to become “human shields” for the rebels. In Turkey’s west, the rise in attempted mob lynchings by nationalist vigilantes is a worrying portent of more violence between ordinary Turks and Kurds.

The PKK is squeezed as never before. In November 2007, when Turkey threatened to invade the Kurdish-controlled enclave, the Americans agreed to let the Turks bomb Kandil and began sharing intelligence with them. Turkey has also mended fences with the Iraqi Kurds whose leader, Masoud Barzani, will soon visit Ankara. This follows a security pact signed in April between Turkey, America and Iraq. Alongside military measures, it takes aim at the PKK’s money, much of which is said to be raised through racketeering and drug trafficking (though the PKK denies this).

Yet Murat Karayilan, the PKK’s top commander in the field, boasts that “neither the most advanced technology nor the best equipped army can get us out of here.” A female PKK fighter called Gulistan says that “dying in our leader’s service would be the greatest honour of all.” A steady trickle of recruits suggests that her views are not uncommon.

Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, knows all this. His chief of the general staff, Ilker Basbug, has repeatedly said that firepower alone cannot vanquish the PKK. Mr Erdogan’s “Kurdish opening”, marked by the launch of Turkey’s first state-run Kurdish-language television channel last year, was a fresh effort to woo the Kurds. It was to have been crowned with a deal between the Iraqi Kurds and Mr Karayilan for the PKK to disarm and relocate its leaders elsewhere.

Peace was within reach in October, when a batch of rebels from Kandil returned to Turkey and were released. But public fury mounted when rebels in guerrilla fatigues proceeded to declare “victory” at rallies across the south-east. A PKK attack in the province of Tokat that killed seven Turkish soldiers was the final straw. The Kurdish opening was put on hold.

Mr Erdogan has since piled the blame on the PKK and on the largest Kurdish party, the BDP. Its refusal to support constitutional changes backed by Mr Erdogan is seen as proof of disloyalty. Yet many observers believe the Tokat attack was staged by PKK hardliners bent on sabotaging peace. This suggests that there are divisions among the rebels, a notion confirmed by Western intelligence sources. Mr Karayilan, who is seen as a moderate, predictably denies this. But he too is full of contradictions. He claims that a unilateral truce declared in April 2009 remains in force. But he also says the PKK has stepped up its attacks because “we remain under constant attack from the Turkish army. We are acting in self-defence.”

BDP circles echo the PKK’s line that Mr Erdogan’s overtures were no more than window-dressing aimed at winning Kurdish votes in next year’s general election. Ordinary Kurds’ support for the PKK may be fading, but they are also turning away from Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development (AK) Party. And what about the mass arrests of 1,500 BDP officials, including elected mayors? Turkey insists that many were PKK operatives trying to establish “a parallel state” in the Kurdish region. Many are former PKK inmates. They say they want to pursue their cause through peaceful means but that the government won’t let them. Even some AK members privately agree that the arrests were a mistake.

Back in Kandil, Mr Karayilan ticks off the conditions of a new truce. “Mr Ocalan must be moved from solitary confinement to house arrest, Turkey must halt all military operations against my men and BDP officials have to be released unconditionally.” The subtext is that, like it or not, Turkey will have to sit down with the rebels. Maybe so, but with which lot? That may be the trickiest question of all.
Economist